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Near East & South Asia

LEBANON

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Results of Election Poll of Younger Generation

93AE0030A Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 Sep 92

[22 Sep p 7]

[Text] The real political situation is not happier than what is reflected by the outcome of the parliamentary elections that were held between 23 August and 6 September and that will be completed in a few days (11 October) in Kasrawan.

The allegations, the aspirations, the talk of "cultural" progress and of growing awareness and good selection continue to be far from actual behavior and, consequently, from influencing the course of events, not to mention the character of the existing political regime.

AL-SAFIR has conducted an election poll to explore the opinion of the Lebanese, especially the young among them, on their political situation as reflected by the elections, which give them the opportunity to say what the civil war prevented them from saying openly.

AL-SAFIR went to people in all parts of Lebanon, beginning with Beirut and then the governorates. The tour covered 21 districts. Sectarian and denominational considerations, as well as sex (males and females), educational level, age, and social condition have been taken into account.

The team members went to universities and high schools and they posed their questions to illiterates, semiliterates, and people with high degrees.

The answers have exposed hidden opinions. From 1,436 questionnaires, facts or details loudly reflect contradiction between the social reality and the allegation of civilization and of eligibility to practice democracy in its genuine sense.

The outcome of the elections has come to expose two points: The Lebanese citizen generally does not say precisely what is on his mind, or he does not exercise his will and couple his words with deeds. Moreover, and herein lies the tragedy, the Lebanese, including the youth among them, continue to be the captives of sectarian leaders whose ideology belongs to political feudalism.

It has become evident, for example, that the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese have engaged in partisan action that they view as the embodiment of fanaticism. Even though this majority (71 percent) supports women's entry into the parliamentary assembly, it also supports the clergymen's entry into this assembly.

It has also become evident that considerations of sectarian differences overwhelm the importance of the democratic considerations for which it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to flourish in political societies that are split sharply along sectarian or denominational lines.

Even though one half of those who answered the questionnaire have demanded that Lebanon be designated a single electoral district, the absolute majority among them (67 percent) have rejected both feudal and militia leaders as

their representatives in the parliament (outcome of the election doesn't reflect this tendency).

Even though sectarian disagreement on holding the elections is evident, considering that a majority of the Maronites in four districts have expressed their opposition to the election, an overwhelming majority from the various sects has supported representation of the (Islamic-national) anti-Israeli occupation resistance in the south in the new assembly.

AL-SAFIR presents today the first part of this opinion poll, which can be considered the most comprehensive and the richest with the flaws and disparities it exposes in the Lebanese society, in the relationship between politics and religion, between government and people, or between principled position and actual practice.

Sample Selection

To obtain scientific data reflecting the youth's opinions objectively, a sample consisting of 1,436 persons was chosen. Data collection extended from the beginning of the summer of 1992 until initiation of the first phase of the election process on 23 August 1992.

Three points were taken into account in compiling the sample: That it represent both sexes (67 percent males and 33 percent females); that it cover all governorates (14 percent from Beirut, 27 percent from Mount Lebanon, 19 percent from al-Shamal [north], 24 from al-Janub [south], and 17 percent from al-Biq'a); and that it include all main sects in Lebanon, although this meant not observing the criterion of random sample precisely (28 percent Sunna, 24 percent Shi'ite, 16 percent Druze, 20 percent Maronite, 5 percent Orthodox, 3 percent Catholic, and 2 percent Christian minorities).

AL-SAFIR drafted this [poll] form in late spring, when the debate on the parliamentary election schedule had not yet been settled. It wanted the poll to explore the citizens' opinions and positions on the elections as much as it wanted it to find out how aware of the principles and techniques of the election process are the youth who were born and who have grown up under the umbrella of the civil war.

Twenty years without elections. This is more than it should be.

Two generations of Lebanese have not exercised their right to vote.

Men and women in their 40's have not had the opportunity to express their opinion—i.e., to participate even in initial (not to say procedural) elections—concerning the course of their political life and the persons who hold the positions of "leadership" among them, who speak in their name, and who represent them.

The form was drafted with utter care and after a lengthy discussion in which a team of political analysts, numerous university professors, and some public opinion polling specialists, plus AL-SAFIR editorial staff, participated.

A large team of specialists, in addition to AL-SAFIR reporters and correspondents in all parts of Lebanon, distributed this form and supervised when it was filled so the answers would reflect what the majority of the Lebanese wanted to say.

The poll has been tantamount to a test of politicization of the youth, especially because a major part of the effort was focused on exploring the opinions of university and high-school students.

The poll has also been tantamount to an attempt to fathom how sectarian or denominational belonging influence political position and how deep the bond is between feudalism, capital, and the sectarian militia.

The poll has, furthermore, been tantamount to an attempt to determine the position of some of the war leaders—clergymen, military men, traditional partisans, resistance fighters, and militia men—hold in the citizen's political conscience.

When we received the completed questionnaires, the government had made up its mind and set the election dates in accordance with a lame amendment introduced into the election law which has kept some electoral districts unchanged, as in the case of Mount Lebanon and al-Biqā', has designated the governorate as an electoral district in other areas, as in the case of al-Shamal [north] and Beirut, and has merged two governorates in a single electoral district in another part, as in the case of al-Janub [south] and al-Nabatiyah.

The editorial staff has split into two groups:

The first group believed that the developments have outpaced the poll and that the questionnaire, with all its answers, is no longer significant.

The second group decided to postpone its response until the answers and their indications are examined, especially since the sample is rich, because many of the questions touch on the social situation and try to explore the horizons of the youth's military thinking and to fathom how profound is democratic awareness generally and because they do not focus on the techniques of the election process and on general tendencies tied to a transient circumstance.

The questionnaire triumphed because of the rich indications harbored in its answers. It was decided to publish the results, which, it was evident, did not need any intervention. Holding the election has not eliminated the need for the poll. Rather, the election has crystallized indications of the practical positions that have corroborated the "theoretical" position expressed by those who have defined their stances through their answers to AL-SAFIR questionnaire.

This sample, though not a random sample (meaning that though it is not scientifically representative), is balanced. The answers given by those polled are stable enough to trust that their results are not chaotic or incidental.

Tables were drawn up and examined and the outcome has been amazing, greatly exceeding our expectations on many points.

Here are some of the most marked indications:

First, ages of male and female participants in the poll ranged from 19 to 39 years, according to the order shown in Table 1. In selecting the sample, we sought to encompass all governorates by reasonable percentages, as indicated by the data given in the table.

Second, while trying to ensure that the sample included young men from all Lebanese sects by percentages approximating the sect's true dimensions, the actual sample figures do not meet this condition.

However, there are enough participants from each sect to make it possible to know, though generally, what is on the minds of the young men from these sects (see Table 3 to find out distribution of youth participating in the sample according to sectarian belonging). What alleviates the imbalance in the number of youth represented in the sample at the sectarian level is that the sample encompasses participants from 21 districts. This enables the sample to be legitimately representative of youth at the national level. In selecting the youth participating in the sample, we sought to ensure that they represent all the educational sectors. The percentage of the educated among participants has been realistic, as shown by Table 5.

The fact that the sample is made up of youth engaged in various professions is very important. The opinions expressed are not confined to [a certain] Lebanese youth sector but encompass all sectors. This is evident in the distribution in Table 6.

The gist of the matter is that the sample is beneficial and important. It provides us with analytical data on the youth's opinions and tendencies, and perhaps it offers the reader an objective review of the election issue, which has been diverted from objectivity by the controversy and the argument engulfing it. Who knows?

The poll shows that all Lebanese sects, excluding Maronites, supported holding the elections this summer. Opposition to the elections was confined to four districts with a Christian majority: Kasrawan (87 percent), al-Matn al-Shamali (86 percent), Bsharri (74 percent), and Jubayl (73 percent). The other districts with a Christian majority supported the elections. The staunchest supporters were the residents of Zgharta District and Zahlah District (63 percent). (See Tables 3 and 4)

The poll shows that all Lebanese sects, including Maronites, acknowledge the government ability to hold the parliamentary election (Table 6). But all expectations find it unlikely that the elections will be held in a democratic atmosphere (Table 7).

The poll results show that the most significant reasons for rejecting the elections are the absence of the proper security climate (38 percent), the presence of foreign intervention

(21 percent), lack of trust in politicians (17 percent), and absence of the guaranties of free expression (13 percent).

The reasons shown by the poll to influence the government ability to hold the elections include the existing disagreements between the government leaders (21 percent), the presence of non-Lebanese forces (31 percent), and the presence of occupied parts in the south (15 percent). Only 6 percent of the total sample noted the problem of the evicted, whereas 10 percent noted that the government needs to get absolute powers in order to hold the elections.

One of the most significant results shown by the poll is that the participants do not know about the election process or even about the Chamber of Deputies. The poll has made it evident that 27 percent of the total sample do not know how long is the chamber's term and that they believe it is three years or less. It has also been shown that 58 percent of the total do not know the number of members in the Chamber of Deputies as determined by the al-Ta'if accord and 89 percent do not know how the vote count is made.

The poll further shows that 74 percent prefer that the elections encompass all districts without exception and that 50 percent demand that the election be held in all of Lebanon as a single electoral district, whereas 22 percent prefer that the elections be held on the basis of the governorate [as an electoral district] and 22 percent on the basis of the administrative district as an electoral district.

The poll says that 67 percent of those polled would not select a militia or feudal leader to the parliament, whereas 94 percent note that they would elect a clergyman if he has a clear platform (17 percent), if he has

Shari'ah and social principles (48 percent), and if he is an honest man (29 percent). Sixty-two percent of the total reflected the tendency to elect a leader of the national resistance in the south.

The poll results also show that the overwhelming majority of those polled prefer that candidates for the parliament be nonpartisan. Only 3 percent of those polled agreed to elect a party candidate, and 59 percent expressed the opinion that partisans are radical, not open, not objective, and fanatic. Fourteen percent said that Lebanon's parties are instruments of sabotage, and 18 percent said they prefer to try nonpartisans.

If compelled to select a partisan candidate, 21 percent of the participants would elect leftist parties, 10 percent rightist parties, and 11 percent religious parties.

The results also indicate that 71 percent of those polled support the involvement of women in parliamentary life. If a woman runs for election, 92 percent of the participants would elect her. The poll further showed that 16 percent of those polled would elect economists to represent them.

Moreover, 84 percent of the polled do not know who is entitled to be present at a polling center; 94 percent do not know the contents of a voter card, and 92 percent do not know the contents of a voter list [qa'imat al-shatb].

The poll has been conducted by a team of researchers from AL-SAFIR. Analysis of the results was supervised by Dr. Hilal Khashshashan, an associate professor at the Political and Administrative Sciences Department of the American University, and Dr. Nabil Dajani, information professor and head of the Social and Behavioral Sciences College.

Table 1: Distribution of Sample Participants According to Age and Sex (Number of Answers: 1,436)

Age	Males	Percentage (to Males)	Females	Percentage (to Females)
15-19	201	21	96	20
20-24	287	30	164	35
25-29	188	19	84	18
30-34	134	14	71	15
35-39	154	16	57	12
Total Number of Questionnaires Answered	964		472	
Total Percentage		100		100

Table 2: Distribution of Sample Participants According to Voting Place (Number of Answers: 1,434)

Governorate	Number	Percentage
Beirut	198	14
Mount Lebanon	385	37
Al-Shamal	268	19
Al-Janub	341	24
Al-Biq'a	242	17
Total	1,434	101*

* Total is not 100 percent due to carryover.

Table 3: Distribution of Sample Participants According to Sect (Number of Answers: 1,430)

Sect	Number	Percentage
Sunna	403	28
Shi'ite	342	24
Druze	225	16
Maronites	287	20
Orthodox	97	7
Catholic	43	3
Christian Minorities	33	2
Total	1,430	100

Table 4: Distribution of Sample Participants According to Place of Residence in Districts (Number of Answers: 1,436)

District	Number	Percentage
Beirut	239	17
B'abda	226	16
Al-Matn al-Shamali	29	2
Al-Shuf	142	10
'Alayh	84	6
Kasrawan	32	2
Jubayl	44	3
Tarabulus (Tripoli)	64	4
Al-Kurah	65	5
Zgharta	29	2
'Akkar	66	5
Bsharri	27	2
Sayda (Sidon)	40	3
Al-Nabatiyah	60	4
Sur (Tyre)	49	3
Hasbayya	50	3
Zahlah	46	3
Al-Biq'a' al-Gharbi	10	1
Ba'labakk	49	3
Al-Hirmil	51	4
Rashayya	34	2
Total	1,436	100

Table 5: Distribution of Sample Participants According to Educational Level (Number of Answers: 1,422)

Educational Level	Percentage
Illiterate	7
Reads and Writes	6
Elementary	19
Intermediate	23
Secondary	23
University	19
Higher Studies	3
Total	100

Table 6: Distribution of Sample Participants According to Profession (Number of Answers: 1,348)

Profession	Percentage
Farm Worker	4
Commercial Sector Worker	8
Industrial Sector Worker	10
Craftsman	5
Small Merchant	8
Employee	10
Teacher	6
Technician	5
Free Professions	5
Regular Armed Forces	4
Small Businessman	1
Establishment Manager	1
Agency Head	1
Higher Cadre	1
Student	18
Unemployed	12
Total	99*
;1;2* Total is not 100 percent due to carryover.	

[23 Sep p 7]

[Text] Parliamentary representation is a modern phenomenon considered by numerous researchers to be the most significant feature of communication between the ruling political elite and the common people. To be specific, this phenomenon emanated from stormy social and historical developments that Europe experienced in the past three centuries and that have led, among other things, to the emergence of the nationalist tendency and the concept of the national state that has stemmed from this tendency.

Elections highlight the nature of the contractual ruler-people relationship, which is based on legitimacy granted by the people through the so-called election process. Elections are intended to strengthen the mainstays of political stability and to facilitate the process of government decision-making by subjugating the minority's wishes to the majority's will.

This is why elections are a degree, though low, of political participation. Before elections are initiated, social rationalism is supposed to proliferate, and the concept of collective social thinking is supposed to mature. But in the less developed countries, which have introduced Western concepts to their political systems, both politicians and citizens of these countries have not understood the social and rational background prevailing in the Western countries before they moved from narrow political systems to other systems founded on a broad popular base.

In Lebanon, which is lost in its affiliations and loyalties between the near Orient and the distant West, it has not been customary for its elections to be an occasion to

entrust the ruling elite with the people's affairs and future or to grant this elite the people's trust and support. The 1947, 1957, and 1968 elections were tantamount to occasions in which the deep political gap between the regime and the people, and among the various sects and denominations of the people themselves, figured clearly.

With the start of the Lebanese civil war and with its tragedies and woes, the Lebanese in 1975 halted their political shelling, which had become monotonous, and replaced it with artillery shelling, which started energetically, promising a fundamental change. This shelling became, in turn, monotonous and turned into a worrying symptom of the sick political struggle.

The al-Ta'if accord, concluded in the fall of 1989, produced a multiphased theoretical action program to end a political crisis that had drunk its fill of the people's blood and gained strength from emigrants in the diaspora.

With the launching of the al-Ta'if mechanism for political action, which was immediately confronted by the so-called "Awn tendency," the nonpartisan political struggle was resumed with an intensity unprecedented in Lebanon's political history.

This being the case, it was normal that the political shelling would focus on the parliamentary election plan, i.e., on the most precise and significant payment due the "al-Ta'if republic" has to make in order to confirm legitimacy of the new political system and its ability to manage the country's affairs.

Herein lies the importance of this poll which tries to find out the Lebanese youth's opinions on the election,

keeping in mind that this youth has grown up politically under the terror of artillery shelling and in a climate of sectarian estrangement and denominational alienation.

The basic question asked by the poll is: To what degree has the new election issue become the juncture on which political polarization in Lebanon hinges?

Are elections a political problem?

This part of the poll deals with the three following election issues:

- The issue of holding elections this summer.
- Principled election choices.
- Expectations regarding outcome of the elections.

The question of holding the elections at this time [summer] will be tackled from three angles:

- Agreement to hold them.
- Government's ability to hold them on schedule.
- Their democratic nature.

Regarding the question of holding the elections, the results show that 57 percent of the participants in the sample agree to holding them before summer's end (see Table 1). The main reasons cited by those who reject elections under the current circumstances range from the belief that the security conditions are inappropriate to the belief that there is foreign intervention, that there are no guaranties of free expression, that there is fear of rigging and forgery, that the domestic conditions are unstable, and that there is no trust in the politicians (see Table 2 to get the percentages of answers).

It is evident that significant as they are, these reasons for rejection are not transient, but rooted in the structure of the Lebanese system and in the behavior of the Lebanese. For example, foreign intervention, fear of rigging and forgery, and lack of trust in politicians are among the ordinary things with which the Lebanese live.

There is no doubt that there are other reasons for rejection which the participants didn't wish to disclose.

The reasons for opposition to the elections do not under any circumstances justify the creation of a deep-rooted crisis like the one Lebanon is experiencing currently.

The political controversy dilemma reflects the presence of a difficult behavioral problem in the Lebanese thinking, namely the problem of political dissimulation. Despite all that has happened, the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese do not dare call a spade a spade. This is a real political tragedy which implies that political deals will be difficult to achieve and which promises that dissension will persist. To deal positively with any political (or nonpolitical) problem, it is required to understand the problem intellectually before a consensual solution is developed for it.

The answers seem to show that Christian youth, especially Maronites and Catholics, are more sensitive to the

obstacles facing the elections than their Muslim counterparts (see Table 3 to get the distribution of answers according to sect).

But the Christian youth's position on holding the elections is not uniform, and there are evident differences in their answers from district to district. Whereas the sample participants from Kasrawan are the staunchest opponents of the elections, we find that participants from Zgharta are extremely enthusiastic for holding them (see Table 4).

So how can one interpret these vast differences that do not seem to emanate from ideological considerations?

What is more logical is that these differences are due to the nature of the structure of political loyalties in Lebanon—loyalties based on provincial subservience to feudal or semifeudal leaders.

In fact, the nature of the Lebanese political leaderships (with their intricate feudal, religious, social, and other components) is not at all compatible with the spirit of the age and does not promise a serious forward march by the political system.

Lebanese Is Captive of Feudalism

It is no secret to anybody that the Lebanese leaders who deal in politics have a negative influence on the followers of their sects. They incite their followers, inflame their passions, and keep the country's citizens from meeting intellectually, even socially.

The Lebanese leaders' influence has surfaced in every crisis since the early 19th century and to this day. This influence has figured in the current crisis in a manner that leaves no place for doubt. It is sad that while this century approaches its end and at a time when talk about international democracy abounds, the Lebanese citizen remains the captive of sectarian leaders whose ideology belongs to the feudal political thinking.

Two-thirds of the sample participants believe that the government is capable of holding elections on schedule (see Table 5), even though this belief is somewhat weaker among Christians, especially among Maronites and Catholics.

The doubt cast on the government's ability is due to the belief among numbers of Christians that the "al-Ta'if republic" is less Christian than it is supposed to be, which also means that it may be less effective than it should be.

Can the elections be held in a democratic climate?

More than one-third of the sample members believe so (see Table 7). Here also, important differences show up in the answers of Muslims and Christians, especially in the answers of Maronites, among whom a small percentage believes the elections climate will be democratic (see Table 8).

Democracy and Sects

It is a must that we take a short pause before the democracy issue. The failure of democracy in the less

developed countries, including Lebanon, is a well-known and extensively documented fact.

A statistical study has shown that the democracy indicator is weak among Maronite Lebanese university students. Other studies on democracy in the Arab world have shown that the practice of democracy has been tragic because the ideological, political, and social given facts required for it are not available. Thus, the requirements for democratic elections will not be met with a government change or by legislating new procedural decrees, or even with the elimination of occupations or with withdrawals. Democratic elections (in the western sense) have their social mentality and their intellectual background, which do not flourish at all in our current cultural environment.

We will move now to the election choices of the sample participants. Who are the deputies that they would like to represent them in the new Chamber of Deputies?

Table 9, which cites a list of the respondents' primary choices, shows a striking difference among the sects.

Maronite youth are less inclined toward party candidates whereas their Druze colleagues are more enthusiastic for such candidates.

It is likely that the conflict within the Maronite sect—a conflict that took a bloody turn at some stage—has had a negative effect on the Maronite youth's partisan tendencies. The same can be said of the Shi'ite youth, whose inclination toward party candidates is not much greater than that of Maronite youth.

The Maronite youth's aversion for party candidates is countered by a noticeable, though subdued, inclination toward traditional candidates. This tendency among them is stronger than among other youth, as shown by the answers they have given. Table 9 also shows that that Druze and Maronite respondents have a stronger preference for secular candidates and a lower tendency toward religious candidates than their counterparts from the other sects.

What is the reason for these answers?

It can be said that Maronites, especially the young among them, have undergone in the past few years a semirevolutionary experience involving change of political concept, and it is believed that this experience has developed new political tendencies among them.

The Druze youth's responses are tied to the Druze sect's position in Lebanon's politics and to awareness by the sect members that for the sect to play in Lebanon an important role that exceeds the dimensions of the sect's actual population numbers, it has to offer modern secular concepts as a basis for political action and for attracting supporters from outside the sect.

These opinions may not reflect themselves in the real situation, i.e. the youth may show a certain political tendency even though they may not adhere to this tendency in actual practice. To put it more precisely, the Druze youth could view the rise of secular leaders with

satisfaction even though they are inclined, instinctively, toward traditional or religious candidates.

This is due to political fear, to lack of a clear futuristic vision, and to conviction among these youth that the Lebanese political system, with its current structure, is not yet capable of securing a political action climate governed by modern controls.

Sunni and Shi'ite youth have a strikingly greater preference than others for religious candidates. This preference is countered by lack of enthusiasm for secular candidates.

It must be noted here that nationalist movements which are based on secularism and which were supported by many youth in the 1960s and 1970s have borne no fruit, have been weakened by successive military and political defeats, and have been driven away from the arena by a new regional and international situation.

Economy Is Most Important

The responses in Table 10 continue the pattern in the preceding table (Table 9). Perhaps the most significant point confirmed by Table 10 is that Lebanese youth with their various affiliations attach special importance to the economic aspect. This is made evident by their persistent support for candidates who possess economic expertise that enables them to deal with Lebanon's deteriorating economic situation.

Tables 11 and 12, which review the youth's choices insofar as partisan candidates are concerned, demonstrate the degree of political polarization in Lebanon and show how Islamic movements have developed among the Sunna and the Shi'ites in a manner compatible with the growing Islamic tendencies in the Arab region.

But we must note that these percentages are concluded from a total of 713 responses.

Despite this, the responses offer explanatory information on the partisan background of those who support and those who oppose elections.

How do the sample participants' expectations of the outcome of the election process, which is scheduled to take place (according to the poll questionnaire) and which has actually taken place this summer, look?

It is striking that in this part of the poll, the youth's responses were not influenced by sectarian differences.

Regarding the appointed deputies' chance to win in the elections, the trend of the responses gives the impression that it is believed that they have a good chance to win (see Table 11), contrary to the expectations concerning the chances of the deputies elected in 1972. The majority of the responses expect a number of changes to occur in the new assembly (see Table 13).

The Lebanese war has given rise to new political leaders and has destroyed numerous traditional leaders. It is

natural that the summer elections will underline this change in Lebanon's leadership makeup.

The absolute majority of Lebanon's leaders are provincial leaders who gain their narrow legitimacy from limited services they render within a sectarian scope. With the start of the war, other leaders who have their private financial resources (and the ability to somewhat influence the course of the distribution of state resources) emerged. This has given them the opportunity to gain sectarian legitimacy on the debris of old legitimate leaderships which had been eroded by the impact of the war.

One of the conclusions derived from the poll is that intense political polarization in Lebanon continues and that it takes an evident religious tendency, even though this polarization conceals within its folds denominational differences (within the same sect) that do not seem to have reached their limit yet. The responses also show how divided are Lebanese youth over the political issue of the hour in Lebanon.

Therefore, and so that the Lebanon's past and present tragedies may not recur in the future, the country needs a dynamic political view of affairs that ends the customary fragmentation and that helps implant modern political concepts that lead the country toward a more stable and less divided future.

Table 1: On Holding Elections This Summer (Number of Answers: 1,435)

Position	Percentage
Agree	57
Disagree	43
Total	100

Table 2: Distribution of Opponents of Election According to the Reasons for Their Rejection (Number of Answers: 572)

Reasons for Rejection	Percentage
Lack of Appropriate Security Climate	38
Presence of Foreign Intervention	21
Absence of Guaranties of Free Expression	13
Fear of Cheating and Forgery	3
General Unstable Domestic Conditions	8
Lack of Trust in Politicians	17
Total	100

Table 3: Position on Holding Elections According to Sect

Sect	Number of Answers	Agree (percentage)	Disagree (percentage)	Total (percentage)
Sunna	403	68	32	100
Shi'ite	342	69	31	100
Druze	225	66	34	100
Maronite	287	26	74	100
Orthodox	97	52	48	100
Christian Minorities	33	58	42	100

Table 4: Position of Christians in Some Districts on Holding Elections

District	Number of Answers	Agree (percentage)	Disagree (percentage)	Total (percentage)
Al-Matn al-Shamali	29	14	86	100
Kasrawan	32	13	87	100
Jubayl	44	27	73	100
Al-Kurah	65	58	42	100
Zgharta	29	86	14	100
Bsharri	27	26	74	100
Zahlah	46	63	37	100

Table 5: Government's Ability To Hold Elections on Schedule (Number of Answers: 1,427)

Opinion	Percentage
Able	67
Unable	33
Total	100

Table 6: Position on Government Ability To Hold Elections According to Sect

Sect	Number of Answers	Able (percentage)	Unable (percentage)	Total (percentage)
Sunna	403	71	29	100
Shi'ite	342	71	29	100
Druze	225	75	25	100
Maronite	287	52	48	100
Orthodox	97	67	33	100
Catholic	43	56	44	100

Table 7: Expectation of Elections Being Held in Democratic Climate (Number of Answers: 1,427)

	Percentage
Yes	39
No	61
Total	100

Table 8 : Opinion on Democratic Nature of Election Climate According to Sect

Sect	Number of Answers	Democratic (percentage)	Undemocratic (percentage)	Total
Sunna	401	40	60	100
Shi'ite	338	45	55	100
Druze	225	46	54	100
Maronite	285	26	74	100
Orthodox	97	31	69	100
Catholic	43	30	70	100
Christian Minorities	32	37	63	100

Table 9: Respondents' Choices Regarding Background of Candidates They Prefer To Represent Them in Chamber of Deputies, According to Sect

First Choice	Sunna (percentage)	Shi'ite (percentage)	Druze (percentage)	Maronite (percentage)	Orthodox (percentage)
Partisan	22	19	52	13	45
Economist	39	44	15	45	30
Secularist	12	10	31	23	18
Traditionalist	6	7	—	15	5
Clergyman	21	20	2	4	1
Total	100	100	100	100	99*
Number of Answers	269	186	186	150	66

* Total is not 100 percent due to carryover.

Table 10: Respondents' Choices on Background of Candidates They Prefer To Represent Them in Chamber of Deputies, According to Sect

Second Choice	Sunna (percentage)	Shi'ite (percentage)	Druze (percentage)	Maronite (percentage)	Orthodox (percentage)
Partisan	7	7	12	5	6
Economist	43	38	38	31	51
Secular	16	16	42	31	36
Conventional	5	8	1	14	4
Clergyman	28	32	8	18	2
Total	99*	101*	101*	99*	99*
Number of Answers	155	130	119	115	47

* Total is not 100 due to carryover.

Table 11: Respondents' Choices on Being Represented in the Parliament by Parties

First Option	Sunna (percentage)	Shi'ite (percentage)	Druze (percentage)	Maronite (percentage)	Orthodox (percentage)	Catholic (percentage)
Progressive Socialist	18	6	79	5	16	13
Amal	5	47	—	2	—	36
Islamic Group	44	4	1	—	2	—
SSNP	18	9	15	9	30	—
Lebanese Forces	5	2	—	63	16	13
Phalanges	—	—	1	9	4	13
Hizballah	2	27	—	—	—	—
Liberals	1	—	—	11	10	13
Ba'th	3	3	—	—	2	—
Communist	5	2	5	2	20	13
Total	101*	100	101*	101*	100	101*
Number of Answers	177	200	176	102	50	8

Total is not 100 due to carryover.

Table 12: Respondents' Choices on Being Represented in the Parliament by Parties (According to Sect)

Second Choice	Sunna (percentage)	Shi'ite (percentage)	Druze (percentage)	Maronite (percentage)	Orthodox (percentage)	Catholic (percentage)
Progressive Socialist	14	7	29	10	28	9
Amal	3	27	—	1	—	—
Islamic Group	18	8	1	1	3	—
SSNP	9	9	12	3	17	—
Lebanese Forces	1	3	3	14	3	9
Phalanges	3	3	2	26	9	—
Hizballah	20	24	5	1	—	—
Liberals	1	2	1	37	3	—
Ba'th	12	7	3	4	9	—
Communist	18	10	43	2	9	81
Total	99*	100	99*	99*	101*	99*
Number of Answers	118	147	97	72	35	11

* Total is not 100 due to carryover.

Table 13 : Election Expectations—Appointed Deputies' Chances of Winning Election (Number of Answers: 1,414)

Likelihood	Percentage
Great	38
Average	38
Small	24
Total	100

Table 14: Chances of 1972 Deputies Being Reelected in 1992 (Number of Answers: 1,413)

Likelihood	Percentage
Great	11
Average	43
Small	46
Total	100

Table 15: Degree of Expected Change in New Chamber of Deputies (Number of Answers: 1,129)

Change Pattern	Percentage
Fundamental	24
Average	54
Small	22
Total	100

24 Sep p 7]

[Text] Lebanon has had no parliamentary elections in the past 20 years. The only reminder that elections are a main component of the political process are those presidential elections, most of which have been controversial and a cause of political dissension, especially the 1976 and 1982 elections.

But obstruction of the 1988 presidential election was a serious precedent that emanated, to a degree, from the eroded understanding of the concepts of democratic elections.

The election thinking has been dominated by a moody atmosphere which gives the following impression: If the parliamentary elections do not produce the results that were desired and determined in advance, then they are unacceptable, the general climate does not permit holding them, and it is better to postpone them.

Thus, opposition to the 1988 presidential elections and opposition to holding parliamentary elections this summer must be viewed as two manifestations of a single political reaction that seeks to freeze the process of renewing the Lebanese political structure. This tendency to postpone and freeze has taken advantage of the war conditions, of the crumbling democratic thought, and the near-forgotten concepts and symbols of the act of election.

This is why it is important to explore the horizons of the election culture among Lebanese youth who have not

exercised their voting rights because of the war conditions and who have not had the opportunity to examine the election concepts and dimensions profoundly.

The youth's election culture is important. They are society's backbone and the dynamo for society's political process. At times of crises and ordeals, the youth become the fuel for and the expression of the political process. The protracted Lebanese war is the best proof of this. Militias flourished, and the gap of political dissension widened as a result of youths' participation, rather monopolization, of the large-scale acts of violence.

Do Lebanese youth understand the dynamic character of the election processes as these processes are supposed to function within the Lebanese framework?

How aware are the youth, for example, of election requirements and of how the elections should be conducted?

Table 1 indicates that more than three-quarters of the sample participants do not know the requirements for holding parliamentary elections. The responses also demonstrate that ignorance of the elections requirements applies to youth from all sects, even though it is more prevalent among Druze and Maronite youth.

The majority of the youth do not know the conditions for nomination for election, even though the general percentage among Christians slightly exceeds this percentage among Muslims (see Table 2). There is a minority of youth who know how the voting process

takes place. The differences between the sects are small and do not seem to imply that a different behavioral pattern exists (see Table 3).

Young people's knowledge of the election process drops even further with their answers to the question concerning contents of the voter list. Even though lack of knowledge is the predominant characteristic in the answers of the overwhelming majority of the youth, it seems that this characteristic is a little higher among Christians than among Muslims (see Table 4).

But what is more important than this is that 99 percent of those who are aware of the contents of the voter list (few as they are), know only one of its three provisions (see Table 5). The question also shows how small is the percentage of young people who know the contents of a voter card (Table 6) or of its three requirements. Four-fifths of those who know something about the voter card are only aware of one of its three provisions (Table 7).

There is no significant difference in young people's knowledge of what goes on in a polling center, whether in terms of the individuals who are entitled to be in the center (Table 8) or in terms of determining the identity of these individuals (Table 9). A continuation of the pattern of answers which show an overwhelming lack of knowledge of the election principles and requirements is reflected in the fact that 90 percent of the youth do not know how the vote-counting process is conducted (see Table 10), or even in whose presence the counting is done (Table 11).

If the majority of the youth are not knowledgeable in the election process, then a high percentage of the youth do not know the number of the Chamber of Deputies members as determined by al-Ta'if accord. The percentage of those who know is a little higher among Christians than among Muslims (Table 12).

Moreover, more than one half the sample participants are aware of the details of the sectarian division of the new Chamber of Deputies as determined by the al-Ta'if accord (Table 13). The percentage of those who know duration of the chamber's term is quite high, as made evident by the answers in Table 14.

What do all these answers mean? Ignorance of the democratic procedures and knowledge of the sectarian details. The importance of sectarian differences in Lebanon overwhelms all democratic considerations and it has been customary to sacrifice the latter in the interest of the former. To be honest, nobody can expect people who have not had the opportunity of participation to know the details of an election process which has its principles and procedures.

It must also be noted that awareness of the details and procedures does not mean much in terms of democratic behavior. Knowing something does not mean adhering to it. A thief's knowledge that stealing is prohibited and disgraceful does not stop him from stealing. This is why when youth are aware of the requirements and details of the election process we should not expect that democratic elections will be accomplished. Such knowledge may reduce chaos in the election process and confusion in its components, but nothing more.

In fact, election education, which is fundamentally democratic in nature, does not exist in Lebanon currently. Moreover, it cannot be said that such education had prevailed before it was ruined by the war. The behavioral structure in Lebanon, as in numerous other countries, is not appropriate for the growth of democracy. Moreover, democracy does not flourish fundamentally in societies experiencing severe political division, especially societies dominated by various religious, ethnic, or linguistic minorities.

Table 1: Distribution of Sample Participants According to Their Knowledge of Election Requirements (Number of Answers: 1,432)

Knowledge of Election Requirements	Percentage
Know	24
Do Not Know	76
Total	100
Sectarian Distribution of Those Responded "Do Not Know" (percentage)	
Sunna	73
Shi'ite	74
Druze	82
Maronite	80
Orthodox	72
Catholic	77
Christian Minorities	79

Table 2: Distribution of Sample Participants According to Their Knowledge of Nomination Requirements (Number of Answers: 1,432)

Knowledge of Nomination Requirements	Percentage
Know	23
Do Not Know	77
Total	100
Sectarian Distribution of Those Who Responded "Do Not Know" (percentage)	
Sunna	75
Shi'ite	75
Druze	78
Maronite	81
Orthodox	80
Catholic	81
Christian Minorities	76

Table 3: Distribution of Sample Participants According to Their Knowledge of Voting Process (Number of Answers: 1,431)

Knowledge of Process	Percentage
Know	19
Do Not Know	81
Total	100
Sectarian Distribution of Those Who Responded "Do Not Know" (percentage)	
Sunna	80
Shi'ite	81
Druze	78
Maronite	82
Orthodox	84
Catholic	88
Christian Minorities	85

Table 4: Distribution of Youth According to Their Knowledge of Voter List (Number of Answers: 1,432)

Knowledge of Contents of List	Percentage
Know	8
Do Not Know	92
Total	100
Sectarian Distribution of Those Who Responded "Do Not Know" (percentage)	
Sunna	91
Shi'ite	90
Druze	90
Maronite	96
Orthodox	97
Catholic	98
Christian Minorities	94

Table 5: Distribution of Those Who Know Content of Voter List According to Degree of Knowledge (Number of Answers: 112)

Degree of Knowledge	Percentage
Know One Provision	99
Know Two Provisions	1
Knows All Three Provisions	—
Total	100

Table 6: Distribution of Sample Participants According to Their Knowledge of Content of Voter Card (Number of Answers: 1,428)

Knowledge of Content	Percentage
Know	5
Do Not Know	95
Total	100

Sectarian Distribution of Those Who Responded "Do Not Know" (percentage)

Sunna	96
Shi'ite	92
Druze	94
Maronite	99
Orthodox	97
Catholic	95
Christian Minorities	100

Table 7: Distribution of Those Who Know Content of Three Provisions of Voter Card (Number of Answers: 70)

Degree of Knowledge	Percentage
Knows One Provision	79
Knows Two Provisions	1
Knows All Three Provisions	20
Total	100

Table 8: Distribution of Sample Participants According to Knowledge of Who Is Entitled To Be Present at Polling Center (Number of Answers: 1,433)

Knowledge	Percentage
Know	16
Do Not Know	84
Total	100

Sectarian Distribution of Those Who Responded "Do Not Know" (percentage)

Sunna	87
Shi'ite	82
Druze	86
Maronite	84
Orthodox	84
Catholic	84
Christian Minorities	91

Table 9: Distribution of Those Who Know Who Is Entitled To Be at Polling Center According to Title (Number of Answers: 217)

Title	Percentage
Center Chief	34
Candidates' Representatives	3
Two Assistants to Center Chief	39
All Three	24
Total	100

Table 10: Distribution of Sample Participants According to Their Knowledge of Vote-Counting Process (Number of Answers: 1,429)

Knowledge	Percentage
Know	11
Do Not Know	89
Total	100
Sectarian Distribution of Those Who Responded "Do Not Know" (percentage)	
Sunna	90
Shi'ite	84
Druze	89
Maronite	92
Orthodox	91
Catholic	98
Christian Minorities	100

Table 11: Distribution of Those Who Know How Vote Counting Is Done and Who Should Be Present (Number of Answers: 153)

Knowledge of Vote-Counting Phases	Percentage
Know One Phase	98
Know Two Phases	1
Know Three Phases	1
Total	100

Table 12: Distribution of Sample Participants According to Their Knowledge of Number of Chamber of Deputies Members as Determined by al-Ta'if Accord (Number of Answers: 1,435)

Know Correct Number	42
Offer Wrong Number	57
Have No Idea of Number	1
Total	100
Sectarian Distribution of Those Who Do Not Know Number (percentage)	
Sunna	69
Shi'ite	53
Druze	59
Maronite	54
Orthodox	43
Catholic	62
Christian Minorities	48

Table 13: Distribution of Youth According to Their Knowledge of Sectarian Division of Deputies as Determined by al-Ta'if Accord (Number of Answers: 1,424)

Response	Percentage
Know Correct Division	57
Have Wrong Idea of Division	4
Do Not Know at All	39
Total	100

Table 14: Distribution of Youth According to Their Knowledge of Duration of Chamber of Deputies Term (Number of Answers: 1,432)

Response	Percentage
Know Actual Term	73
Gave Wrong Answer	17
Do Not Know at All	10
Total	100
Sectarian Distribution of Those Who Responded "Do Not Know" (percentage)	
Sunna	79
Shi'ite	86
Druze	83
Maronite	83
Orthodox	91
Catholic	72
Christian Minorities	82

[25 Sep p 7]

[Text] Local leaders who have arisen in succession since the idea of a Lebanese entity came into existence in the 17th century are feudal leaders fundamentally. When Lebanon got its independence from France in 1943, sectarian feudal leaders took over the main positions in the political system that was supposed to operate in the fashion of a Western-style democracy.

Political sectarianism has contributed in an unprecedented manner to entrenching the mainstays of feudalist politicians in Lebanon by highlighting them as the natural leaders of their sectarian factions.

The popular memory still recalls some incomplete endeavors to cut down the size of political feudalism. Often, those endeavors failed because they were closer to a struggle within the same club and were more of endeavors by some to eliminate their counterparts and to monopolize power than endeavors to keep up pace with or to boost the elements of democratic change.

Most often, the ruler's weapon was the election.

Because president of the Republic was always in the strongest position and because he controlled the course of the political game, he tailored the election law to fit

his objectives and he redivided electoral districts "arbitrarily" to weaken or eliminate his opponents and to bring in a parliamentary majority that approves all his actions.

With his "vague" and indeterminate "constitutional" powers and with his capabilities, always camouflaged and reinforced with sectarian privilege, the president of the Republic was most akin to a king of kings, feudal chieftain, or paramount sectarian leader.

Thus, when Camille Sham'un made an endeavor under the pretext of fighting feudalism and reducing the influence of feudal leaders in all parts of Lebanon through the 1957 parliamentary elections, the result of his endeavor was the "1958 revolution." This is because he rigged for the elections a law that fitted his purposes. He redivided the electoral districts so as to make the "government," to which he was the authority, the party most capable of controlling the results. Moreover, Sham'un was facing a high political tide, and he tried to drive it back from his fortified position at the head of the "legitimate government."

It is true that Sham'un did not descend from a feudal family. But he joined the club, appealing to the influential figures at the time and taking advantage of the French-British conflict. Thus, he became the strongest power by virtue of his position as president of the Republic.

If Sham'un rode to power on the back of a political opposition which was predominantly sectarian in character (this opposition toppled Bisharah al-Khuri's administration in 1952), then he generated with his method of government and his alignment with foreign domination schemes against the Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir-led pan-Arabist revival a political opposition that was also predominantly sectarian (Islamic this time) in character.

If the regime enjoyed a predominantly sectarian popularity, then the feudalist political leaders who opposed Sham'un and who had been thwarted by him in the elections also had their broad popular bases that had been incited and whose political tendencies had been discredited.

As the feudalists surpassed Sham'un, enlisting against him the broad popular tide that was opposed to acceding to the West and its schemes, they later opposed fiercely the endeavors of his successor, President Fu'ad Shihab, to modernize the political system and to develop a broad popular base supporting the regime. Ultimately, the feudalists were able to thwart Shihab's endeavor and to destroy his course by resorting to sectarian weapons that have always been readily available. In 1968, the feudalists created the Tripartite Alliance, basically Maronite, thus paving the way for the civil war, which did not take long to materialize, erupting in 1975.

Local feudalists failed to understand the circumstances and requirements of the age. So they opposed political and social change, taking advantage of both transient and deep-rooted sectarian splits, which they exploited in the service of their personal interests, paying no heed to the fate of a country that they professed to love or to the fate of a people whom they said they wished nothing but all that is well.

The protracted civil war, which ended technically less than three years ago, has eroded the feudalist leaders' power and influence, especially among the Maronites and the Shi'ites, and energetic militia leaders have emerged to seize the more significant portion of the sectarian decision-making with its dark religious hue.

But militia activities have not been free of narrow opportunistic tendencies colored with a deviousness that was reflected clearly in the rapid and unjustifiable aggrandization of militia leaders and of many of those enrolled in the militia ranks.

This is why the parliamentary elections—an issue raised earnestly early this summer—will be tantamount to a popular referendum on the legitimacy of the feudalist and militia leaders.

It is true that opposition to holding the elections, especially among the Maronites, has its strategic regional and domestic dimensions. But this opposition also has an undeniable psychological justification. Many of the leaders weakened by the war and by internecine fighting fear to submit to a popular vote of confidence, especially by the youth who are the mainstay of political action in

the militia-dominated Lebanon and who are an indicator foretelling the public opinion tendencies, though somewhat intensely.

This is why when asked if they prefer feudalist leaders or militia figures, more than two-thirds of the youth participating in the sample answered that they do not like either (see Table 1). Aversion to feudalist and militia leaders is widespread among youth from all sects, although a little less among Druze and Shi'ites.

Among Druze, leadership assumes several aspects simultaneously. It is a feudal leadership, but the flexibility it has derived from its unique position permits it to turn into a militia leadership when the circumstances dictate it, or even to an Islamic or national Lebanese leadership. Through their answers to numerous questions connected with their parliamentary choices, Druze youth have clearly reflected a sectarian unity unmatched by the answers of the youth from other sects.

As for the Shi'ite youth's answers, they reflect clear aversion for feudalist leaders and a degree of support for militia leaders that exceeds the support shown by their counterparts from the other sects for militia leaders.

Why are Shi'ite youth different somewhat from the other Lebanese youth?

The answer to this question lies partially in the fact that political mobilization among the Shi'ite within purely Shi'ite movements and parties is relatively new when compared to such mobilization among the other Lebanese sects.

The answers also give the impression of political void among the majority of the youth and underline the system's narrow political horizon, which doesn't offer youth diverse political options but rather pushes them to adopt sectarian stances that serve their leaders and strengthen their positions.

We will move now to a point that is more precise than the preceding one. This point is embodied in the youth's view of the possibility of seeing the the national southern resistance leaders represented in the parliamentary council.

It is well known that the national resistance is Islamic resistance mainly and that approval of representation of the resistance fighters in the parliament means representation of the Islamists, and of Hizballah specifically. What opinion do the voting youth have of the resistance leaders?

Nearly two-thirds of them have said that they approve of these leaders' entry into the parliament (see Table 2).

It is evident that the total percentages are not enough, especially in a country like Lebanon which is disjointed demographically and socially, and especially at the sectarian level.

It is evident from Table 3 that Muslims are more inclined than their Christian counterparts to select Islamic resistance leaders, which is as expected.

It is interesting that the percentage of Druze that agree to the entry of Islamists to the parliament exceeds the percentage of Shi'ites, who are the ones concerned with the entry of resistance leaders to the assembly!

Why? Because there is inter-Shi'ite competition [presumably meaning debate] on who is more eligible to represent the sect in the parliament whereas there is no Shi'ite-Druze competition. (This is because the al-Ta'if accord has entrenched political competition within the same sect but not between the sects).

What does the Christians' reasonable approval of the entry of resistance leaders to the parliament mean? It means several things, including a logical political view of the Lebanese political reality, disappearance of the slogans calling for the creation of an "Islamic republic" in Lebanon, a change steering Iran's political course away from religious radicalism or, as a Christian "fundamentalist" has told me, "Muslim fundamentalists are not necessarily worse than the other militias."

Table 1: Comparison Between Militia Leaders and Traditional, Feudal Leaders (Number of Answers: 1,414)

If You Were Given Choice To Be Represented in Parliament by Some Militia Leaders or by Some Traditional, Feudal Leaders, Who Would You Choose?

Choice	Percentage
Militia Leader	19
Feudal Leader	13
Do Not Like Either	68
Total	100

Table 2: Resistance Leaders in Parliament (Number of Answers: 1,426)

Would You Elect a Southern National Resistance Leader to Represent You in the Parliament?

Response	Percentage
Yes	62
No	38
Total	100

Table 3: Resistance Leaders in Parliament According to Sectarian Distribution (Number of Answers: 1,421)

Sect	Number of Answers	Approve (percentage)	Disapprove (percentage)	Total (percentage)
Sunna	400	67	33	100
Shi'ite	339	75	25	100
Druze	225	79	21	100
Maronite	285	35	65	100
Orthodox	97	57	43	100
Catholic	43	42	58	100
Christian Minorities	32	50	50	100
Total	1,421			

[26 Sep p 7]

[Text] Lebanon is going through a difficult phase currently. It is hard labor that one hopes will move the country from a state of war to a state of peace. The controversy surrounding the election is nothing but a part of the labor.

The question raised continues to be: Does the peace phase have its figures or will it continue to be an extension of the war phase and the leaders it produced?

Needless to say that war, especially a civil war, creates new social, cultural, leadership, and demographic conditions, as a consequence of which it is impossible to restore the prewar conditions. This is why we have received answers that expect an influential presence for the war leaders in the new parliamentary makeup, thus reaffirming the changes generated by the war. The youth from all governorates expect the war leaders to figure strongly in the new parliamentary assembly (see Table 1). But what is interesting is the extreme emphasis the

youth of al-Biq'a Governorate have put on this issue. Statistical intersections show that this high percentage is due to the strong role played by the Shi'ite youth, especially in Hizballah. Even though the percentage of those who expect the war leaders to figure prominently is so high that it leaves no place for one to think that any youth group expects the opposite, it is noticed that the higher the educational level, the stronger the expectation, with some variance (see Table 2). The expectation percentage is a little higher among the Sunna and the Shi'ites than among the other sects (see Table 3).

A high expectation percentage does not mean much in itself. It is tantamount to no more than awareness of the course of political affairs, and it does not register the degree by which the youth are psychologically inclined toward these expectations. Before we deal with this delicate issue (the youth's political tendencies and loyalties), we must note the political earthquake that has hit Lebanon since the start of the civil war.

A rational analyst realizes that the makeup of the political leaders who ratified the 1943 charter is responsible to a large degree for the eruption of the Lebanese crisis (this presentation does not, of course, at all cancel the other complex elements of the Lebanese crisis). As for the worsening sectarian split among the Lebanese, the structure of the 1943 leadership was basically feudal, traditionalist, and not at all fit to keep up pace with a political system operating in the modern fashion and striving to develop democratic representation.

The main problem faced by the 1943 charter was the incompatibility of the environmental structure of the Lebanese political system with the political leaders running the system, even giving it life. This incompatibility led to the downfall of the charter with its structure and its leaders.

This is why there has been a need to renew the political leadership in Lebanon. But this renewal has come on the debris of worn-out leaders and not as a development of these leaders, and herein lies the danger. The war has produced numerous political leaders. But because they are new, they are not experienced in the rules of the political game, especially in democracy and its tendency toward compromise.

What is more serious is that these leaders have emerged as a result of the war's actions and reactions, thus developing a narrow (provincial sectarian) legitimacy under the shadow of devastation and bloodshed.

If Lebanon's new lot is a fundamental change of leadership, among other changes, then it behooves us to find out the nature of these changes. This issue will be tackled under the heading of the "youth's political loyalties."

Political Loyalties of Young People

The young people's political loyalties are interesting. They are undoubtedly one of the results of the protracted Lebanese war and of the ceaseless political dissension. What is striking in this regard is the significant impact of the stifling economic crisis that has been besieging the Lebanese for eight years and that has been driving them farther apart. The overwhelming majority of the youth who have been crushed by the war and its economy aspire earnestly for economic leaders to take their place in the parliamentary assembly, perhaps they will bring about salvation.

If the youth are society's mirror, then the Lebanese society has changed greatly.

The preference for candidates with an economic background is followed immediately by preference for secular candidates, i.e., nonsectarian candidates. Have the Lebanese youth gotten tired of the sectarian light in which the Lebanese crisis is projected? This is what is indicated by the data in Table 4. The partisan choice came third, and the choice of traditional candidates was last.

The consequences of the war figure clearly in young people's choices. The 'Awn phenomenon has been demonstrated clearly in the preference shown for the "military option." Resistance leaders and Muslim clergymen have also figured among the current options. But what is striking is the weak tendency toward militia candidates. It seems that the militias' actions during the war, and even after the war, have created among the youth a general impression that the militia-oriented option is not a serious option.

Preference for the partisan option comes fundamentally from the younger group and is much lower among the older group (fifth group). This low percentage could be attributed to the intellectual maturity of the older group and to their awareness of failure of the partisan performance in Lebanon. The preference for economists, secularists, military men, and resistance leaders increases with age, especially among the youth in the fifth age group.

If age differences are important in determining the choice of candidates, then the difference in educational levels seems to be less significant, except for the preference for secular candidates who are more popular among the more educated youth (to find details of the connection between educational level and type of the parliamentary candidate preferred by the sample participants, see Table 5).

Regarding parliamentary choices, sectarian belonging gives a clearer picture than the picture offered by age and educational-level differences. The Druze's main choice is partisan. For the Christian minorities, this choice is economic. Christians [in the majority] have a greater preference for the military (a clear indication of the pro-'Awn tendency) than Muslims. Among Muslims, Shi'ites are greatly interested in resistance leaders, whereas the Sunni choice puts the emphasis on clergymen. Lebanese youth from all sects are unanimous in their aversion for militia candidates (see Table 6).

We will move now to detailing the partisan option. Despite the evidently small significance of the partisan option among the youth, this option is still very important, regardless of whether the youth like it or not. The Lebanese parties, with their polarizations and their flawed sectarian representation, are one of Lebanon's political mainstays. Moreover, partisans are the heirs to the feudalists and traditionalists. The most important supporters of the Progressive Socialist Party and the Communist Party fall within the younger age group whereas Amal's supporters fall within the older age group. Support for the two Islamic parties (Hizballah and the Islamic Group) is not influenced by age differences (see Table 7 for detailed data).

It does not seem as if the educational level has a clear impact on the pattern of the youth's choices, as demonstrated by Table 8. Lebanon's political problems are not problems of education. Political polarization, which assumes a strong sectarian dimension, reduces greatly

the impact education has on softening the political climate. Ultimately, an educated person operates within the climate prevalent in Lebanon. It is a secret to nobody that this climate is sectarian.

The importance of sectarian differences figures clearly in determining partisan choices among the youth, as demonstrated by the responses provided in Table 9. Support for the Progressive Socialist Party comes mainly from the Druze. Amal Movement is a purely Shi'ite movement, the Islamic Group is a Sunni group, the Phalanges and the Liberals are Christian parties, the Lebanese Forces are Maronite, and Hizballah is Shi'ite. The two parties that give the impression that they are national parties (in terms of their representation of numerous Lebanese factions and sects) are in fact two minority parties. The Druze and the Orthodox are represented in them more clearly than other sects.

Ultimately, it must be noted that clergymen have extensive support among the Sunna and the Shi'ites. This support has figured clearly in the outcome of the latest elections.

Why do the youth support clergymen?

The youth give three main reasons for this support, the most significant of which is that clergymen are principled, then honest, and, finally, have clear programs (see Table 10 to find out the percentages).

Islamic fundamentalism in Lebanon (regardless of its roots and its regional atmosphere) has two Lebanese dimensions: The first is tied to the climate of general political corruption and chaotic political action and the second is tied to Maronite radicalism which began to assume a Christian fundamentalist dimension in the late 1960s, thus contributing somewhat to inciting religious passion among the Muslims who were aware of the injustice of the 1943 charter.

It is concluded from this that the background of political dealings in Lebanon and the mentality and individual tendencies of politicians should not be allowed to bear fruit in the future if Lebanon is to be rescued from its ordeal and if it is to follow the path of the more advanced countries. The narrow-mindedness of the Lebanese traditionalist, feudalist, and partisan leaders has contributed to reinforcing the flaw in the political environment and has greatly helped perpetuation of the elements of division among the Lebanese.

Table 1: Distribution of Answers Expecting War Leaders To Win Parliamentary Seats, According to Governorate (Number of Answers: 1,412)

Governorate	Number of Responses	Expect (percentage)	Do Not Expect (percentage)	Total Percentage
Beirut	194	87	13	100
Mount Lebanon	379	89	11	100
al-Shamal	268	90	10	100
al-Janub	333	91	9	100
al-Biqā'	238	96	4	100

Table 2: Distribution of Answers Expecting War Leaders To Win Parliamentary Seats, According to Respondents' Educational Level (Number of Answers: 1,409)

Education	Number of Responses	Expect (percentage)	Do Not Expect	Total Percentage
Illiterate	95	89	11	100
Can Read and Write	83	88	12	100
Elementary	270	92	8	100
Intermediate	327	89	11	100
Secondary	332	90	10	100
University	259	91	9	100
Higher Studies	43	100	—	100

**Table 3: Distribution of Answers Expecting War Leaders To Win Share of Parliamentary Seats, According to Sect
(Number of Answers: 1,430)**

Sect	Number of Responses	Expect (percentage)	Do Not Expect (percentage)	Total Percentage
Sunni	403	92	8	100
Shi'ite	342	92	8	100
Druze	225	90	10	100
Maronite	287	89	11	100
Orthodox	97	88	12	100
Catholic	43	81	19	100
Christian Minorities	33	88	12	100

Table 4: Distribution of Answers Regarding Identity of Candidate, According to Age Group

Group	First 15-19*	Second 20-24	Third 25-29	Fourth 30-34	Fifth 35-39	Total
Partisan	27	18	22	14	12	93
Economist	32	28	28	37	40	165
Secularist	15	16	15	25	31	102
Traditionalist	6	5	3	5	4	23
Resistance Leader	10	12	16	14	19	71
Military	11	11	11	16	18	67
Militia Figure	2	11	3	7	2	25
Clergyman	15	12	13	9	12	61
Independent	16	22	18	10	12	78

* Calculated on basis of entire percentage for first choice plus half the entire percentage for the second choice.

Table 5: Distribution of Answers Regarding Identity of Parliamentary Candidate Favored by Respondents, According to Educational Level

Education	Illiterate*	Can Read and Write	Elementary	Intermediate	Secondary	University	Higher Studies	Total
Partisan	26	14	18	22	17	17	10	124
Economist	31	29	32	28	29	36	33	218
Secularist	9	15	14	16	19	23	22	118
Tradition- alist	4	7	5	6	6	3	—	31
Resistance Leader	18	13	11	16	12	12	13	95
Military	11	13	12	10	13	9	—	68
Militia Figure	5	4	4	4	—	3	—	20
Clergyman	10	16	14	12	14	11	2	79
Independent	11	14	17	19	21	26	26	134

Calculated on basis of entire percentage for first choice and half of the entire percentage for second choice.

Table 6: Distribution of Answers Regarding Identity of Candidate Favored by Respondents, According to Sect

Sect	Sunni*	Shi'ite	Druze	Maronite	Orthodox	Catholic	Christian Minorities	Total
Partisan	16	12	46	10	32	6	22	144
Economist	34	31	22	30	33	35	39	224
Secularist	11	9	36	19	21	24	12	132
Tradition- alist	5	5	-	11	4	4	3	32
Resistance Figure	12	28	13	3	7	—	6	132
Military	10	5	5	18	18	24	12	92
Militia Figure	1	5	4	5	1	1	3	20
Clergyman	25	17	4	6	1	2	9	64
Independent	21	9	12	22	20	26	29	149

* Calculated on basis of entire percentage for first choice plus half the percentage for the second choice

Table 7: Distribution of Answers for Preferred Party of Respondents

Age Group	15-19*	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	Total
Progressive Socialist	13	9	7	6	6	41
Amal	4	3	5	7	6	25
Islamic Group	6	5	2	4	6	23
SSNP	6	5	5	4	4	24
Lebanese Forces	6	3	3	3	4	19
Phalanges	1	1	1	—	2	5
Hizballah	4	3	6	4	7	24
Liberals	1	2	1	—	2	6
Ba'th	2	1	1	—	1	5
Communist	6	4	4	2	2	18

* Points calculated on basis of entire percentage for first choice plus half the percentage for the second choice.

Table 8: Distribution of Answers of Preferred Party of Respondents, by Educational Level

Education	Illiterate*	Can Read and Write	Elementary	Intermediate	Secondary	University	Higher Studies	Total
Progressive Socialist	12	15	15	21	17	16	8	104
Amal	15	12	10	6	5	6	10	64
Islamic Group	6	6	6	11	10	5	8	52
SSNP	17	10	6	7	10	7	12	69
Lebanese Forces	7	10	7	8	5	5	5	47
Phalanges	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	14
Hizballah	9	6	9	6	5	6	11	52
Liberals	2	3	2	2	5	2	—	16
Ba'th	3	3	2	3	2	2	—	15
Communist	3	2	7	7	5	5	4	33

* Points calculated on basis of entire percentage for first choice plus half the percentage for second choice.

Table 9: Distribution of Answers Preferred Party of Respondent, According to Sect

Sect	Sunni*	Shi'ite	Druze	Maronite	Orthodox	Catholic	Christian Minorities	Total
Progressive Socialist	5	2	34	1	6	1	6	55
Amal	1	17	—	—	—	4	—	21
Islamic Group	12	2	—	—	—	—	—	14
SSNP	5	4	10	2	9	—	1	22
Lebanese Forces	1	1	—	12	5	2	3	24
Phalanges	—	—	—	3	2	1	1	7
Hizballah	2	13	—	—	—	—	1	16
Liberals	—	—	—	4	4	7	2	17
Ba'th	2	2	—	1	2	—	1	8
Communist	2	30	9	—	8	1	3	53

* Points calculated on basis of entire percentage for first choice plus half of percentage for second choice.

Table 10: Most Significant Reasons for Approval of Selection of Clergymen to Parliament (Number of Answers: 447)

Reason	Percentage
They Have Clear Programs	18
They Are Principled	51
They Are Honest	31
Total Percentage	100

[28 Sep p 7]

[Text] Statistical intersections have not shown the presence of any noteworthy connection between educational level and general opinions on elections.

In fact, the variance in viewpoints concerning the election issue has been confined to some differences connected with sectarian belonging and district, i.e., place of residence.

To underline the weak impact of educational level on forming opinions concerning the unstable democratic character of the elections, we will cite the data in Table 1, which show that those who believe most strongly in the democratic character of the elections are the illiterate (43 percent), followed immediately by graduates of higher university studies.

Regarding the comprehensive nature of parliamentary elections, three-quarters of the respondents in the sample believe that the elections should encompass all parts of Lebanon (see Table 2). More than half the respondents support the proposal to make all of Lebanon a single electoral district, even though the Druze and Christian minorities are the most enthusiastic for this proposal. Meanwhile, the intersections show that Catholics and Maronites are the least enthusiastic (see Table 3).

But these responses provide special indications of extreme significance. Let us take as an example the

responses of Catholic youths, 44 percent of whom have expressed the opinion that all of Lebanon should be a single electoral district. In a politically and demographically divided country like Lebanon, such a percentage must be acceptable, even though it is not high and it shows an obvious wish for coexistence and for developing a strong political system that regulates the sectarian relations and neutralizes their negative effects.

What are the reasons that cause a high percentage not to be convinced of the government ability to hold the elections on schedule?

It seems that one of the reasons is tied to the Syrian military presence in Lebanon (33 percent) and emanates from the belief that the Lebanese Government, which is affected by Syrian influence, does not have absolute powers and lacks sovereignty (11 percent). For more details on the distribution of responses, see Table 4.

How do the youth view the idea of running for election themselves?

More than one-third of the youth favor the idea of running for election themselves, of course if the right conditions for it are available (Table 5). The conditions in this case vary from one young man to another. Some believe that these conditions are tied to the Israeli occupation and Syrian presence and some believe that they are tied to the presence of a new Lebanese government that enjoys political and popular legitimacy.

Even though some Lebanese youth tie the idea of running for election to the presence of certain conditions, the percentage of those who would run is very high.

Is this a sign of vigor or of sickness? It is more likely that it is a sign of an illness tied to the wish for quick self-aggrandization! Commenting on this high percentage, a satirist has said that the "Lebanese people love to get rich. One-third of them try to do so by way of business, the other third by way of singing, and it seems that the final third tries to get rich by way of the parliament."

What is the youth's opinion on the entry of women into parliamentary life?

The responses show that nearly two-thirds of the respondents approve of women's entry into the parliament (see Table 6). What is striking is that the percentage of males who approve of this is a little higher than the percentage of

females. The responses also show clearly that Christian youth are more enthusiastic for the entry of women to the parliament than their Muslim counterparts (Table 7). Responses by Sunni youth show the lowest approval rate for women's entry to the parliament whereas responses by Orthodox youth reflect the highest approval rate. But the percentage of those who believe that women have the same capabilities (for public service) as men is somewhat lower than the percentage of those who approve women's entry into the parliament (Table 8). Even though it is low, this percentage is significant by virtue of its positive nature. It is believed that the war conditions, which have saddled women with heavy burdens, and at times with heavier burdens than those imposed on men, have led to a significant change in Lebanese society's view of women. To a large degree, the Lebanese woman has become a working and producing citizen. Moreover, her constructive role in the family and in raising children surpasses the role of her counterparts in most of the region's countries.

Table 1: Connection Between Expectation of Democratic Elections and Educational Level (Number of Answers: 1,422)

Education	Illiterate	Can Read and Write	Elementary	Intermediate	Secondary	University	Higher Studies
Yes	43	39	42	40	35	34	40
No	57	61	58	60	65	66	60
Total Number of Answers	95	84	272	326	335	267	43
Total Percentages	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 2: Distribution of Answers as to Whether Elections Should Encompass All Provinces (Number of Answers: 1,428)

Answer	Percent
Yes	75
No	25
Total	100

Table 3: Distribution of Respondents According to Their Opinion on Scope of Electoral District (Number of Answers: 1,422)

Scope of District	Percent
Administrative District	22
Governorate	23
Lebanon as Single Electoral District	55
Total	100

Scope of Electoral District, According to Sectarian Distribution

	Number of Answers	District (percentage)	Governorate (percentage)	Lebanon (percentage)	Total Percentage
Sunna	401	18	27	55	100
Shi'ite	334	20	25	55	100
Druze	225	16	16	68	100
Maronite	284	32	21	47	100
Orthodox	97	28	15	57	100
Catholic	43	28	28	44	100
Christian Minorities	32	19	19	62	100

Table 4: Distribution of Those Who Believe Government Is Unable To Hold Elections, According to Reasons They Have Offered (Number of Answers: 433)

Reason	Percent
Due to Presence of Occupied Areas in the South	16
Because Candidates Have Not Offered Serious Programs	5
Because Elections Will Not Be Free	6
Due to Presence of Many Evacuees	7
Due to Presence of Non-Lebanese Forces	33
Because Government Does Not Have Absolute Powers	11
Due to Disputes Among Government Leaders	22
Total	100

Table 5: Youths Opinions on Running Personally for Election to Parliament if Appropriate Conditions Are Present (Number of Answers: 1,422)

Position	Percent
Yes, I Would Run	35
No, I Would Not Run	65
Total	100

Table 6: Position of Respondents to Women's Entry Into Parliamentary Life (Number of Answers: 1,431)

Position	Percent
Support Women's Involvement	70
Oppose Women's Involvement	30
Total	100

Table 7: Respondents' Opinions on Women's Entry Into Parliamentary Life, According to Sect (Number of Answers: 1,425)

Sect	Number of Answers	Do Not Approve (percentage)	Approve (percentage)	Total Percentage
Sunna	402	61	39	100
Shi'ite	340	72	28	100
Druze	225	63	37	100
Maronite	286	78	22	100
Orthodox	97	86	14	100
Catholic	43	79	21	100
Christian Minorities	32	72	28	100
Total	1,425			

Table 8: Respondents' Opinions on Whether Women Have Same Capabilities as Men in Area of Public Service (Number of Answers: 1,422)

Opinion	Percent
Yes, Women Have Same Capabilities	61
No, Women Are Less Capable	39
Total	100

Chamber of Deputies Composition, Changes Viewed*93AE0069A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 8, 9 Sep 92*

[Article by Jalal Mahmud, Lebanese Researcher Living in Britain: "Lebanese Chamber of Deputies and Ruling Elite: One Hundred Families Entered Parliament and War, Producing New Political Equation"]

[8 Sep p 8]

[Text] More than 20 years ago, attorney Nabih Birri tried hard with several political authorities, including the mother of Kamil al-As'ad, a former speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, to be included as a candidate on their lists, but he could not persuade them to include him. Now Birri is heading Amal Movement and a list encompassing all of South Lebanon that counters the list put together by al-As'ad himself. This fact is one of the most noticeable signs of the developments that the Lebanese election game has undergone.

This condition has not been in the south alone. Al-Biqa' al-Gharbi has experienced a similar condition, although from a different angle, when Major General Sami al-Khatib, the current interior minister and a former Army officer, put together a list with which he and all the candidates on his list won. The same applies to the list formed by Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid in Ba'labakk-al-Hirmil, which won in its entirety. The same thing happened in Beirut when former Prime Minister Salim al-Huss headed a list on which the majority of the candidates won.

These four examples, and perhaps others, represent a remarkable difference in the Lebanese elections, the first in the 1990's and the first after 20 years of no elections, because what had been agreed and recognized was that, since independence, candidate lists are exclusively headed by representatives of 16 to 20 historical families. Even though these families were gradually losing their historical assets, which had been based on vast land ownership, they managed to transform their gained political asset into some sort of political feudalism that became their capital in government and authority. In this regard, they relied their old family assets, which derived their constant spark from the assets of this or that family's sect.

The four examples we have cited regarding the current elections have enabled sons of nonhistorical families to head candidate lists and even to win election with them, or with most of them.

This is the first difference that appears from a preliminary review of the outcome of the 1992 election. The second difference is that several parties have won parliamentary seats that had never belonged to them before. We are not talking here of the Progressive Socialist Party [PSP], which is, in fact, a self-contained partisan condition and which has a special characteristic given to it by Kamal Junblatt, its founder and departed leader. Kamal

Junblatt is a descendant of a historical family that has been in power throughout Lebanon's modern, and even old, history.

Two, perhaps three, parties are part of this discussion: the SSNP [Syrian Socialist National Party], the Socialist Arab Ba'th Organization, and Hizballah.

The first party has won five seats and may perhaps form a bloc of six or more deputies when the entire election is over. The second could have as many as seven deputies, having already won four seats. Regardless of whether it is a party or not, Hizballah is a religious formula that has won eight seats, if we count the al-Biqa' and the al-Shamal seats. The Islamic group has won two seats in Beirut, and this number may increase.

Whatever the reason for the success of these parties, what can be said is that their success has always been faced with difficult-to-penetrate red lines. These parties may not have gained the political weight they currently have if they had to make their gains in a heated election battle. But they are in the Chamber of Deputies, while a prominent party candidate such as Dr. 'Abd-al-Majid al-Rifa'i, who had run for election repeatedly as the Ba'th Party candidate in Tripoli and who had gotten 18,000 votes one time and 20,000 votes another in heated campaigns, has not won. However, the number of votes [gained by al-Rifa'i] has given the regime and its men something to consider for the future. It was the same with past communist party candidates.

Significance of Two Differences

So the monopoly on heading lists has been broken, and the barrier that had prevented the presence of political parties' representatives in the parliament has also been broken. The parties were present in the arena only, [but not in the parliament].

Perhaps these two developments have been made possible by the conditions under which the latest, and one-sided, elections have been held. The boycott by the political and party forces in the eastern districts, and even some western districts such as Beirut, has given some candidates the opportunity to overcome historical barriers that they would not have been able to surpass had the game been played according to its customary rules.

The boycott was not the only reason. Another reason is that the al-Ta'if accord's stipulation that the number of deputies be increased from 108 to 128 has expanded the scope of the possibility of penetrations that will affect the Lebanese parliament, which had been closed to many. The starting point was the appointment that brought in deputies who are not subject to the criteria of conventional deputyship, but to the criteria of war and to the forces of the fait accompli that they have produced, and who have come to be called the "notables," perhaps meaning the "armed notables" who had controlled the country's security and who have to control its peace. The appointment was followed by confirmation through election. Why is piercing the tradition of lists headed by certain candidates a distinguishing mark and a departure? And why is the arrival of these kinds of party men also a distinguishing mark and a difference?

These are two questions that fall within the framework of the story of the regime and of rulers in Lebanon, not only currently, but also for more than a century of this country's history.

We say this at a time when the the survival, legitimacy, and unity of the Chamber of Deputies that will come with the final election round in the south will be threatened unless subsequent elections are held to give boycotters the opportunity to catch up with the bandwagon. We highlight these differences and others, regardless of whether this chamber stays or is driven out for one reason or another, because as an institution, the Chamber of Deputies needs to be dissected and its composition and survival need to be examined profoundly, particularly because it is the only institution that has not fallen with the war and that has not been toppled by the war. Moreover, neither the warlords nor the "game of nations" that swept Lebanon was able to topple this institution, and herein lies the secret that must be sought and that uncovers the part of the election game that was concealed throughout the era of independence and earlier.

Chamber: 'Roof-Like' Institution

Even though it may seem that the unity of the Chamber of Deputies is threatened for the first time, with the possibility that it will split into two chambers because of the insistence of the government and its allies on holding the elections in the manner in which they have been held, this possibility had been present throughout more than 10 years of the war in Lebanon—a possibility that could have materialized but never did. Even though the government often turned into two governments and the single cabinet became two cabinets; even though the same job position came to be shared by two civil servants, one from East Beirut and the second from West Beirut; even though the Lebanese Army turned into two, rather several, armies, the fact that this Army is the country's shield and the defender of its unity notwithstanding—even though all of this happened, the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, meaning the institution and not just the chamber that was elected in 1972 and whose term was extended repeatedly, seems to have been prohibited from splitting into two chambers in real life, even though it was always divided over more than one issue and subject during the war. The reason for this is not the importance of the Chamber, but because the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies has always been viewed as the "country's roof," which would bring the country down with it if it collapses. This is despite the fact that most of those who wanted this roof to remain standing are the same people who demolished most of the walls holding it up, almost causing it to collapse. But the roof has survived. Rather, it has been maintained at the Lebanese level, by people in both East and West Lebanon, and at the Arab and international levels.

The reason for maintaining this "roof-like Chamber of Deputies" is that it is simultaneously the legal and actual framework that encompasses Lebanon's real rulers. It is

the formula with which and within which the "Lebanese ruling elite" or ruling factions meet.

This is why Lebanese, Arab, and even international political authorities have decided to prevent a split in the current Chamber of Deputies and not to allow a split to continue if it materializes and divides the Chamber into two chambers: An old chamber supported by the forces that have rejected the current election and a new chamber produced by the elections that have been held in a special manner that has not risen to a level that provides the opportunity to bring in a serious and effective assembly.

The decision to exclude division or duality in the parliament, or the Chamber of Deputies, is due to the fact that in "Lebanon, the country and the homeland," the ruling factions from Mount Lebanon were brought together with the ruling factions from what was known as the "Ottoman provinces" within a representative framework that was once known as the Administrative Assembly, another time as the Representative Assembly, and a third time as the Chamber of Deputies. In fact, this assembly was tantamount to a framework encompassing representatives of the historical families that were placed in the position of power and authority more than one-and-a-half centuries ago and that remained in place throughout the Ottoman Sultanate, the French mandate, and the era of independence.

Those families, with the financial and agricultural capability they embodied and with their representation of the sects and their interests, were given momentum, assets, and capabilities, and they survived and continue to survive with what they were given, even though there are no more than 20 families altogether. Generation after generation, they inherited the power. Whenever their authority was threatened by new developments and rising forces, they managed to envelop and incorporate those forces so that they would survive. This is why those "20 families" continued to head every candidate list, permitting the representatives of new factions to join their lists. Consequently, the 20 families—along with some other families attached to them and permitted to join the ruling enclave because this ruling "elite's" survival interests dictated it—seemed to constitute the Lebanese ruling elite. If the new chamber, produced by elections that continue to be controversial, has brought in the representatives of attached families, it is because the flawed election game has allowed these representatives to come with or without a vote, within a list or independently. But all of the previous chambers are the best example of alliance of the "elite families" and "attached families" who together formed the regime's framework and the ruling group in Lebanon.

These families, which totaled nearly 100 families within the alliance, have ruled and continue to rule with or without the approval of the majority of the citizens and through confrontation or through congruence with the majority of the citizens. The ruling elite has managed to stay in its position of power for the longest time possible,

i.e., throughout more than half a century. This success has caused the elite to create a state of suspension that is incompatible with any development or change in the Lebanese society and that has actually become a ceiling pressing down the new forces rising in society. Thus, this elite has developed into a form of an inescapable political fate.

'Elite' and Dynamic Forces

On the other hand, dynamic forces had been growing in the Lebanese society as a result of economic and social development, and certain labor union and political party forces were produced by this development. Collectively, these factions formed forces of the dynamic socio-economic movement. Although the ruling elite was able to entrench its presence and to settle in its position of power, even though it was in a state of suspension, it was not able to develop society economically and socially. Consequently, it was unable to stem the rise of those dynamic growth forces, but it managed to shut the doors of the Chamber of Deputies in the face of those forces, thus obstructing their representation and, consequently, their transformation into a part of the ruling elite.

Although the ruling elite was able to prevent those dynamic forces from entering the Chamber of Deputies and kept them within the framework of the political and economic system solely, it was unable to control their activity entirely or to impede the effective dynamic character of this activity. This compelled those dynamic labor union and partisan forces to turn to other action arenas, staging strikes, demonstrations, and acts that stormed the Lebanese society throughout most of the years of independence. Significant violent incidents occurred in 1952, 1958, 1961, 1969, and 1975—the most significant way station and the year in which the nearly 15-year long war began. The war had numerous domestic and foreign causes, and those forces displayed varied tendencies, all of which were embodied in taking up arms and going to war. Even though the war was not against the ruling elite but a war among the partisan and labor union forces themselves, the *fait accompli* forces, or the so-called notables, vied for the ruling elite's authority without going through the Chamber of Deputies or elections. This is why deputies were appointed. The latest election has come to absorb the *fait accompli* forces and notables and to include them in the Chamber of Deputies so they will rule with, not in place of, the ruling elite.

This is why numerous questions arise regarding:

- The nature of the Lebanese ruling elite and how the Chamber of Deputies has managed to create and embody it.
- The nature of the true alliance between the historical families and the attached families.
- The true nature of the family-sectarian dimension in Lebanon's game of government and rulers.
- What is the composition and true nature of this game, as figured out by examining the parliamentary and

representative assemblies in the pre-independence eras?

- What are the dynamic and active forces in the Lebanese society and how have they come to clash with the ruling elite?

Many questions can be raised at a time when Lebanon is actually and truly preoccupied with what form of government these forces want and with rulers who are endorsed through elections, whatever form they take and wherever they are held. However, they are elections on the basis of the families ruling in the name of the sects.

Family-Sectarian Representation

A review of a number of historical documents and books has shown that the districts in Mount Lebanon maintained a formula by which the mountain was divided among the feudalist families that controlled it. Feudalism was the basis, and it became a fundamental part of and intertwined with the sectarian-religious formula. In 1842, there were two administrative districts, which were divided among the agro-religious, feudalist families as follows:

In the first district, the division (from left [north] end to the right [south] end of the mountain), was as follows:

- Al-Zawiyah: Its chieftains were Bani Dahir [the Dahir clan].
- Upper and Lower al-Kurah, owned by al-'Azar clan (Greek Orthodox).
- Al-Quwayti': Owned by the Abi-Sa'b clan chieftains (Maronites).
- Jubbah Bsharri: Maronite feudalism.
- Al-Batrun territory: Maronite and Shiite feudalism.
- Jubayl territory: Christian feudalism.
- Jubbah al-Munaytirah: The Hamadah clan chieftains, the al-Husayni clan chieftains; Christians and Shiites.
- Al-Futuh: Controlled by al-Dahdah clan, with a Maronite population majority.

The second administrative district was divided as follows:

- Kasrawan: Al-Khazin clan and al-Hubaysh clan were its chieftains.
- Al-Qati': The Qa'idbayh and Abi-al-Lama' clans (Maronite) were its chieftains.
- Al-Matn: The Qa'idbayh clan, the Murad clan, and the Faris sub-clan, a part of Abi-al-Lama' clan, were its chieftains; Christians and Druze.
- Coastal Beirut: Its chieftains were the Shihab clan (Christians and Shiites).
- Lower al-Gharb: Its chieftains were the Arslan clan (Druze).
- Upper al-Gharb: Its chieftains were the Nakad clan (Christians and Druze).
- Al-Jard: Its chieftains were 'Abd-al-Malik clan, al-Salih clan, and al-Khuri clan (Christians and Druze).
- Al-Manatiq [outlying areas]: The Nakad clan (Druze and Christians).

- Al-'Urqub: The 'Imad clan and 'Id clan chieftains (Druze and Christians).
- Al-Shuf: the Junblatt clan chieftains (Druze and Christians).
- Jazzin: the Junblatt clan chieftains (Druze and Maronite population).
- Al-Shuf al-Bayadi: Abi-al-Lama' clan (Christians, Druze, and Sunna).
- Iqlim al-Tuffah, Iqlim al-Kharrub, and Jabal al-Rayhan: The Junblatt clan chieftains (these provinces' population comprises Druze, Sunna, and Christians).

As for the other Lebanese territories under direct Ottoman control, they were ruled by the sultanate, but also through theocratic clans, such as al-As'ad clan and al-Khalil clan in the south.

Sectarian Representation in Figures

This feudal-sectarian division continued to be the basis of the parliamentary representation map, with some limited modification and alteration. This is why names belonging to a limited number of families from the various sects have continued to be reiterated in most of the representative and parliamentary assemblies, beginning with the first parliamentary assembly of 18 October 1927 and ending with the current assembly (elected in 1972). A total of 370 Lebanese citizens have been elected to the assembly a total of 882 times. They belong to 218 families [clans] from numerous sects: Sunni, 53 families; Shiite, 28 families; Druze, 10 families; Maronite, 67 families; Orthodox, 34 families; Catholic, 13 families; Protestant and Latin Catholics, eight families; and Armenian Orthodox and Catholics, 10 families (some families belong to numerous sects).

These sects have been represented in these assemblies by a total of 896 seats, distributed as follows:

Maronites, 280 seats; Sunna, 182; Shiite, 166; Orthodox, 104; Druze, 58; Catholics, 52; Armenian Orthodox, 27; Armenian Catholics, five; Protestants, four; and minorities, 18.

The Maronite sect has been given the largest percentage (182 seats), so it would continue to dominate.

A study of the 1920-37 preindependence assemblies shows that their sectarian and family composition was divided as follows (see Table 1):

The table shows that 42 families entered the assemblies once from 1920 to 1937, whereas one family entered them 11 times, two families nine times, four families seven times, eight families six times, five families five times, six families four times, 11 families three times, and 21 families two times.

This means that 100 families were present in the representative assemblies 48 times in 17 years. Thus, representation of the Lebanese was confined throughout that period to just 100 families, even less than 50 families if we exclude those families who entered the assembly once or twice. More than 63 out of the 100 families did not enter the assembly more than twice. Three families were present in all the assemblies during the 17-year period.

Only one family, namely the Thabit family, represented the minorities constantly in those assemblies. The Shiites were represented by the Haydar, al-Zayn, al-Fadl, al-As'ad, Qaz'un, 'Usayran, Hamadah, and al-Husayni families. The Sunnis were represented by the Bayhum, Shihab, and 'Abd-al-Razzaq families. The Maronites were represented by al-Khuri, al-Khazin, Iddih, al-Sa'd, and Nammur families. The Druze were represented by the Junblatt and Arslan families; the Catholics by the Skaf family; and the Orthodox by the Trad [or Tarrad] and Tuwayni families.

As for the growth of each sect's share of the seats (see Table 2), it was as follows: Maronite representation started with six seats and grew to 20; Sunna representation began with four and grew to 11; Shiite representation began with two seats and rose to 11; Druze representation began with one seat and increased to four; Catholic representation began with one and grew to four seats; and Orthodox representation began with three and rose to seven seats. Armenian Orthodox and other minorities were represented late and by a small percentage.

Throughout 17 years, the main sects were represented in eight assemblies by 271 seats, distributed as follows: Maronites, 88 seats; Sunnis, 53 seats; Shiite, 47 seats; Orthodox, 35 seats; Druze, 18 seats; Catholic, 17 seats; Armenian Orthodox, seven seats; and minorities, eight seats.

This disparity in the distribution of seats among the sects determined the main government positions: The presidency went to the Maronites; the premiership to the Sunna; the Chamber of Deputies speakership to the Shiites; and the vice speakership to the Orthodox.

Families in the 1920-37 Assemblies

Number of Families	Number of Times Elected	Number of Assemblies
42	1	1
21	2	2
11	3	3
6	4	4
5	5	5
8	6	6
4	7	7
2	9	8
1	11	8
100 Families	48 Times	8 Assemblies

Sects in the 1920-37 Assemblies

Year	Maronite	Sunna	Shiite	Druze	Catholics	Orthodox	Armenian Orthodox	Minorities	Number of Seats
1920	6	4	2	1	1	3	—	—	17
1922	10	6	6	2	1	4	—	1	20
1925	10	6	5	2	2	4	—	1	20
1926	5	3	3	1	1	2	—	1	16
1927	15	9	8	3	3	6	—	2	46
1929	15	9	8	3	3	6	—	1	45
1934	7	5	4	2	2	3	1	1	25
1937	20	11	11	4	4	7	4	1	62

[9 Sep p 8]

[Text] The economic and professional distribution of the deputies in the 1920-37 representative assemblies is most significant because it shows that owners of arable land were dominant. Out of 17 deputies in 1920, 14 were landowners, and out of 62 deputies in 1937, 33 were landowners. Next to landowners, lawyers, doctors, and journalists began entering the representative assemblies, whereas the representation of merchants, businessmen, teachers, and employees continued to be small.

Politically and at Party Level

We have not attached any importance to the political and party affiliations in the preindependence assemblies because those affiliations were not entirely clear. But by the eve of independence, two general political tendencies, nurtured by the French mandate, had become apparent:

The first gained the mandate's direct sympathy and was represented by Amin Iddih, a president of the Republic during the mandate.

The second was not with the mandate, or it is better to say that the mandate was not against it, because the mandate authorities wanted to have opposition to the

first tendency so the political game would become complete. This tendency was represented by Shaykh Bisharah al-Khuri, the first president of the independent Lebanon.

The first tendency developed into the National Union Party, which came to be known later as the National Bloc, and the second tendency developed into the Constitutional Party, or the Constitutional Bloc.

The two parties vied to gain the presidency while the mandate authorities watched. They would strengthen or weaken Iddih or would embrace Bisharah al-Khuri or clip his wings. They would encourage Iddih openly while encouraging al-Khuri secretly. Partisanship became evident in the parliamentary elections that were held in 1934 after the departure of High Commissioner Ponsot and the arrival of Comte de Martel.

However, the mandate authorities brought Iddih as president of the Republic and Bisharah al-Khuri as head of the delegation negotiating with the French. Those authorities then continued to manipulate Lebanese politics, weakening Iddih's assets and strengthening al-Khuri's position. Ultimately, the "limited struggle" culminated with the election of al-Khuri as president of the independent Republic.

There was no opposition to the mandate in the sense that there was no party "opposed to the mandate." The

Constitutional Bloc was comfortable with the mandate and always tried to beat the National Bloc to gaining the mandate's friendship and sympathy. The struggle between the Iddih camp and the Khuri camp was not a struggle centering on the mandate—for or against—but on power, influence, gains, and presidency under the umbrella of the mandate. The two parties were Mount Lebanon parties, meaning that they were Maronite parties that attracted subsidiary alliances in some districts.

As we have already noted, there were other parties, of which the most significant were the Communist party, the SSNP, and the Phalanges. But they were not influential politically. Moreover, the rise of the Phalange Party as the party of the mandate system and the mandate government impeded the influence of the communist party in particular because the communist party wasn't a purely Lebanese party but a joint Syrian-Lebanese party.

Under the umbrella of the regime and of the mandate government, with its Constitutional Bloc wing and National Bloc wing, the Lebanese Phalange (a new party and grouping) rose to play its role from within the regime and to become the national opposition's youth movement.

It is evident from this that it would not be scientific to determine the political affiliation of those assemblies because this bilateral political formula—the National Bloc and the Constitutional Bloc—existed only by inasmuch as the mandate authorities needed it. It was just political bilateralism from "above," i.e., it existed within the class that surrounded and supported the mandate. Its influence descended to the people "below" whenever there was a need to go down to the people with positions and opinions. This "descent" was made through the prevailing sequential family-sectarian order because there were no organizations, not even social or political bodies. There were gatherings that rallied around individuals who, in turn, joined the National Bloc or the Constitutional Bloc, depending on how much this or that bloc served the interests of the individual concerned.

Continuity or Disjunction

It is evident from this review that continuity prevailed in the preindependence assemblies—a continuity based on domination by the family system, which also formed the basis for the crystallization and perpetuation of sectarianism. The mandate authorities, embodied in the French High Commission, encouraged all this to the degree that the press characterized that encouragement as an "infernal contract between those family and sectarian leaders and the French authorities." It was an infernal contract through which the election mechanism was developed. Consequently, candidate lists were formed on full understanding with those leaders.

That continuity was, in fact, tantamount to a process of entrenching leaders produced by all the previous eras: the Ottoman era, the era of the two administrative districts, and the era of the provincial government. The

French mandate then followed to develop those leaders whom it considered beneficial to it and who helped that mandate set up a Lebanese government loyal to it and to its country. The mandate strengthened those leaders gradually through the representative assemblies that were either appointed or elected, and it made no difference which. The result was always the same, i.e., elections held at the will of the French high commissioner.

But all of this changed when World War II broke out. The international and European balances of power changed when the allies entered Lebanon. Whereas the French high commissioner had monopolized the "government game" in Lebanon previously, the British commissioner and the U.S. consular agent, and then the consuls of certain Arab countries, especially of Egypt and Iraq, came to share this game with him.

It then became evident that what had changed were the "players"—the main "foreign players—and that the game continued to revolve around the same blocks: Family representatives, sects, leaders and figures united by the same kind of interest to preserve their interests through the regime. This constituted, of course, some sort of internal continuity, whether in terms of the composition and makeup of the representative assemblies or in terms of the affiliations of their members. Those "anointed leaders" and those whose leadership was reinforced in the 17 years from 1920 to 1937—the years of the representative assemblies—maintained their leadership in the later assemblies that came with independence. Here, the following observations can be made:

First, when the French forces occupied Lebanon and the Greater Lebanon was proclaimed in 1920, the representative assembly members were appointed on a decree by the French high commissioner.

Second, with the arrival of 22 May 1922, the Lebanese began to exercise their voting right after the high commissioner had abolished the Greater Lebanon Administrative Committee which lasted from 22 September 1920 until 8 March 1922. A decree by the high commissioner determined that election would be held as follows: "In the first phase, the legal voters will be chosen. A week or two weeks after their selection, these voters will elect the deputies in the second phase."

Third, the Constitution became the main source of parliamentary representation in 1926. Article 16 of the Constitution stated the following: "The legislative authority in Lebanon shall be assumed by the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies." This provision was amended afterward to read: "The legislative authority shall be assumed by a single body, the Chamber of Deputies."

Structure of 'Independence' Assemblies

Parliamentary assemblies then came in succession throughout the era independence from 1943 to 1972, and to 1986 by extension, not election, because of the war. Thus, after a lapse of more than half a century from

the first independent parliamentary assembly, the principle of sectarian representation continued to exist, and was even entrenched. Parliamentary seats were increased from 55 to 99, and the system continued to rely on the French high commissioner's decree of 1943, on the spirit of the 1840 administrative council system, and on the spirit of the 1860 provincial government system.

The bond between the deputy's sectarian affiliation and his family affiliation continued, becoming more and more obvious in the independence assemblies. In a survey of deputies from 1920 to 1968 and through 1972, it becomes evident that the Haydar clan was represented in 14 assemblies; al-Zayn clan in 11 assemblies; the Junblatts in 13 assemblies; the Khazin clan in 14; the Ghusn clan in 12; the Iddih clan in 12; the Shihab clan in 11; the al-Fadl clan in 10; the 'Usayran clan in 12; the Arslan clan in 15; the al-Husayni clan in 12; the Qaz'un clan in 11; the Zuwayn clan in 11; the al-As'ad clan in 13; the Hamadah clan in 13; the al-Khuri clan in 12; the Franjiyah clan in 12; the Karami clan in eight; the Salam clan in 7; and the Harawi clan in eight.

All these families [clans] have maintained the titles awarded them during the Ottoman Sultanate, such as bayk [bay]; shaykh, amir, and muqaddam. The element of family inheritance of the deputyship was demonstrated by the fact that sons succeeded fathers and grandfathers to the parliamentary assemblies.

The sects were represented by a small number of families throughout 45 years and in 14 assemblies.

In a public opinion poll conducted in the 1980's, 70 percent of those polled considered the Chamber of Deputies the country's highest authority, 15 percent considered it a ruling elite; 13 percent considered it a domineering class or faction; and 2 percent considered it an assembly of warlords and peacemakers. As for the deputies themselves, this is how they have viewed it:

Fifty deputies viewed themselves as a ruling elite; 40 deputies as the highest authority; five deputies as a

domineering faction; and four deputies viewed themselves as warlords and peacemakers.

As for the assembly that will come with the problematic elections, it will be infiltrated more extensively by "representative deputies" who have won accidentally, even though they don't belong to the ruling elite. These newcomers to the world of the elite belong to professions, parties, and factions similar to those existing in the 1972 assembly, with some minor differences. In Beirut, for example, four attorneys, two engineers, two physicians, two former premiers, one of whom is a university professor, three businessmen, and a journalist have won. As for the lists which have won, the man heading the al-Shuf list comes from the same family that has always headed the candidate list there. The same applies to 'Alayh. Both lists included professionals (lawyer, school teacher, and employee) and businessmen. In al-Biqā', the head of a list whose family had customarily headed candidate lists nearly lost whereas lists lacking the traditional leadership won in places such as Ba'labakk and al-Biqā' al-Gharbi. The winning lists in al-Biqā' brought in professionals (teacher, lawyer) but the majority included businessmen, people involved in agriculture, and industrialists. The general makeup of the winners makes the coming assembly similar in composition to the current assembly—after some deputies were appointed to it—with one big difference, namely the absence of a large number of representatives of the historical families from the coming assembly.

It can be said that the formula according to which the latest elections were held has resulted in shaking the parliamentary composition, except in al-Shuf and 'Alayh where the conventional model survived. In Beirut, the elections have brought in a diverse variety. The same applies to al-Biqā', except for Zahlāh, which preserved its traditional composition. Meanwhile, Ba'labakk has produced unconventional lists. In al-Shamal [the north], the lists range from those headed by a parliamentary leader belonging to a historical family to lists dictated by the pressure of the new forces, mostly religious in character.

Professional Composition of Assemblies

Year	Number of Deputies	Landowners	Lawyers	Physicians	Journalists	Merchants and Businessmen	Teachers and Employees
1920	17	14	1	1	1	—	—
1922	30	20	2	4	4	—	—
1925	30	17	3	3	4	1	2
1926	16	13	2	—	—	—	1
1927	46	36	4	1	2	2	1
1929	45	21	11	4	3	4	2
1934	25	13	6	4	1	—	1
1937	62	33	14	4	8	2	1

Sectarian Representation in Independent Assemblies

Sect	1943 Assembly	1968 Assembly	1972 Assembly
Maronite	18	30	30
Sunna	11	20	20
Shiite	10	19	19
Orthodox	6	11	11
Druze	4	6	6
Catholic	3	6	6
Armenian Orthodox	2	4	4
Armenian Catholics	—	1	1
Protestant	—	1	1
Minorities	1	1	1
Total	55 Deputies	99 Deputies	99 Deputies

Sectarian-Family Composition

Muslims		Christians	
Sect	Family	Sect	Family
Sunna	60	Maronite	70
Shiite	36	Orthodox	40
Druze	9	Catholic	15
		Minorities (Protestants and Latin Catholics)	8
		Armenians (Orthodox and Catholics)	11
Total	105 Muslim Families		144 Christian Families

Development of Professional Representation

Assembly	Number of Deputies	Land Owners	Lawyers	Physicians	Engineers	Merchants and Businessmen	Bank Owners	Employees
1943	55	22	23	4	1	3	—	2
1968	99	17	37	7	7	10	4	17
1972	99	16	32	15	2	14	3	17

Party and Political Affiliations

Assembly	National Bloc	Constitutional Bloc	Socialist	Phalangist	Liberal	Najjadah	Armenian Dashnak	Independents
1943 (55 Deputies)	20	35	—	—	—	—	—	—
1968 (99 Deputies)	6	3	4	9	7	1	4	the remainder
1972 (99 Deputies)	5	4	8	7	11	—	4	the remainder

Family, Party, Bloc Composition of Chamber Viewed

Increase in Party Representation Noted

93AE0070A Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 10 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by Ahmad Zayn-al-Din: "Map of Blocs and Parties in 1992 Assembly; Parties Constitute One-Third of Chamber"]

[Text] The 1992 Chamber of Deputies is unique among all chambers known to Lebanon because of the phenomenon of extensive party representation that characterizes this chamber.

This chamber includes 15 parties and party-like movements represented by nearly 42 deputies, which is unprecedented in any previous election held in Lebanon since the State of Lebanon was created and its parliamentary assembly was founded.

If this unique phenomenon is compatible with the rules of a democratic parliamentary system in which party life represents the cornerstone, then the party phenomenon in the new chamber is stamped by and coupled with two fundamental things:

First, this broad party representation amounts in its entirety to one-third of the total number of deputies. So even if all parties form a single parliamentary bloc, this purely partisan bloc will not have the number required to block the quorum needed for general sessions and, consequently, to control the chamber's decision-making.

Second, the representation of this number of parties in the new chamber has come on the debris of other party representation that was deep-rooted in parliamentary life and influential in the chamber's decision-making, such as representation of the Phalange Party, the National Bloc, and, at a later stage, the National Liberal Party.

In light of the new reality emerging from the latest parliamentary elections, two questions can be raised:

- Why this party "boost" in the 1992 chamber?
- In the new chamber, can one wager on a "pressure bloc" capable of playing the "ruling party" role that is recognized in assemblies existing in the democratic parliamentary systems?

In answering the first question, it must be said that party infiltration of the 1992 chamber has followed a "shock of despair" that had developed among the parties and the public and lasted from the early years following the war until the eve of the election. This shock should have had a negative impact on party representation in the new chamber, not the positive impact it has had. So, why this horde of partisans and parties in the new chamber?

Perhaps the reasons leading to these results include:

A. The boycott that has given the opportunity to certain parties to replace other parties.

B. The party composition of the overwhelming majority of these parties that are founded on the strength of the "individual leader." This characteristic can transform this party representation into something similar to the successful election of any nonpartisan person in some given district. It is no coincidence that most of the parties that have come into the new chamber and that are represented by their chairmen or secretaries general, or by more than one of the two, are simply single-governorate parties that haven't managed to expand to other areas.

C. The redivision of electoral districts stipulated by the amendment introduced into the election law.

Therefore, it can be said that party representation in the new chamber has, in the main, reflected the public opinion tendencies. However, there are numerous circumstances and given facts that have contributed to the outcome. If these circumstances and given facts were not present, party representation in this chamber would certainly have been different from what it is.

In light of this party situation in the new chamber and as a result of the circumstances and given facts that have led to this situation, it can be said that a wager on a truly influential party role in the 1992 chamber will be a losing wager. Therefore, and perhaps for the same reasons, one can expect mixed parliamentary blocs to exert the main pressure in the decision-making process of the 1992 chamber. Thus, this chamber will, despite its partisan "embellishment," turn into something similar to the previous chambers where the decision-making was lost at times between government houses and palaces, on the one hand, and independent blocs, on the other—that is when those blocs had the chance to enjoy their independence.

Party Map

But how does the party map in the new chamber look?

Theoretically, the parties represented in this chamber are the following, and they are cited with the number of deputies committed to each of them:

Union Party, one; Arab Democratic Party, one; al-Wa'd Party, one; Islamic Group, three; the Habashis, one; Armenians, seven; popular committees and associations, one; National Struggle Movement, one; Democratic Party, one; Nasirite Popular Organization, one; Amal Movement, five; Ba'th Party, two; Hizballah, eight; SSNP-EC, six; and PSP, three.

In light of this new party map and because of the "dictates of interest," blocs may be formed in the new chamber on the two following basis:

1. "Political blood relations": In this regard, it is not unlikely that a bloc will be formed by the Islamists in the chamber, with its backbone consisting of Hizballah, the Islamic Group, and the Habashis, i.e., a total of 12

deputies who could be joined by some independents, though these may be very few.

It is also likely that a bloc will be formed of the Ba'th Party, the Arab Democratic Party, and the SSNP. It is also likely that the PSP and Amal Movement will maintain their independence and that each will form its own bloc.

2. Here, the role of independent blocs in the new chamber emerges. The PSP bloc includes 10 deputies, and it could form another "struggle front" if al-Shuf list deputies—namely Marwan Hamadah; Nabil al-Bustani; George Ni'mah; Khalil 'Abd-al-Nur; Samir 'Awn; Fu'ad al-Sa'd, a deputy from 'Alayh; and Ayman Shuqayr, a deputy from B'abda—joins it.

As for Amal, it is likely that it will form a mixed sectarian bloc instead of joining the Islamist bloc. If so, it will have to rely on a majority of the "liberation list deputies," namely: 'Ali 'Usayran, Michel Musa, Nadim Salim, Samir 'Azar, Sulayman Kan'an, 'Imad Jabir, Sa'id al-As'ad, and Zahir al-Khatib, in addition to its (Amal's) own four deputies. This bloc may also court 'Abd-al-Latif al-Zayn, Ahmad Suwayd, and Habib Sadiq, but nothing definite has developed in this regard yet.

In opposition to these blocs that have parties as their nucleus, contacts are under way to form two main blocs of independents:

The first is to be headed by former Prime Minister Salim al-Huss, and it may be joined by deputies from the "change list" and others, including: 'Abd-al-Rahim Murad, Muhammad Qabbani, Usamah Fakhuri, Muhammad Yusuf Baydun, 'Isam Nu'man, Najah Wakim, Bisharah Murhij, Joseph Mughayzil, Asmar Asmar, and Riyadh al-Sarraf. It is not unlikely that Mustafa Sa'd and other independents will also join it.

The second will be an independent bloc comprised of al-Matn District deputies, namely: Nasib Lahhud, August Bakhus, Habib Hakim, Riyadh Abu-Fadil, and Michel al-Murr. Contacts may succeed in enlisting deputies Habib Kayruz, Manuel Yunis, 'Abd-al-Latif al-Zayn, Rashid al-Sulh, Fayiz Ghushn, and perhaps Jean Ghanim and Michel Samahah.

As for the Armenian deputies, most of whom are from the Dashnak Party, they will remain independent, as they have always been, and will form their own independent bloc.

Study on Roles Played by Prominent Families

93AE0070B Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 14 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by Ahmad Zayn: "Study on 'Family' in 1992 Chamber of Deputies"]

[Text] A female television producer once asked the late President Camille Sham'un for his opinion on the special role that the Chamber of Deputies could play. He responded: "Our Chambers of Deputies have specific

and well-known roles and characteristics. Perhaps the only common denominator among them is Speaker Sabri Hamadah."

At the time, former President Sham'un did not explain the historical aspect of his answer, but it can be said today that the new Chamber of Deputies will be the first chamber not to have the late Speaker Sabri Hamadah as one of its members.

Since the elections of 13 July 1925, under whose patronage the Lebanese Constitution was issued and the first legislative assembly was initiated in Lebanon, and since the House of Representatives and the Senate were merged on 18 October 1927, not a single chamber of deputies, excluding the new assembly, was elected or appointed without having Sabri Hamadah as one of its members.

If the 1992 elections have taken place without participation by the al-Biq'a'-al-Hirmil deputy because of death, then the trust of representing the "family" in the chamber has been transferred to "cousin" Marwan. Thus, the new chamber has maintained some characteristics of the chambers to which former President Camille Sham'un referred, even though the reference was far from being intended to mean the idea or concept of a "will."

The fact is that "family continuity" in parliamentary representation is evident in the history of our chambers of deputies, thus making them similar to that Western family that continued to produce outstanding musicians throughout two centuries!

Even in recent elections, eight families were represented in successive chambers of deputies an average of 12 to 19 times per family, with a total of 126 seats divided among 40 individuals (see Table 1). Families whose presence has not been interrupted in the successive chambers of deputies since independence include the Hamadah, al-As'ad, Arslan, Franjiyah, Lahhud, and al-Husayni families. As for individuals who, in addition to [the late] Speaker Hamadah, continued to be deputies without interruption, they include Majid Arslan, who was not a member of the first legislative assembly because of he was too young, and [the late] President Camille Sham'un, whose deputyship was interrupted only when he became president of the Republic. There have also been "individual deputyships" that were interrupted for just one term, mainly in the 1953 and 1957 elections.

The phenomenon of "family representation and parliamentary inheritance" is evident in the seat "quota" allocated for individuals whose names belong to families that have been in the successive chambers since the first legislative assembly was created. It is clear that a total of 903 parliamentary seats have been allocated in accordance with the election laws and that these seats have been filled by 403 individuals only, including 25 individuals who replaced original deputies by either election or appointment due to a parliamentary seat being vacated. Of the 903, only 195 persons were elected to a

single term. The others held the seat at a rate of two to 13 terms, i.e., since initiation of the first legislative assembly in 1927. (See Table 2)

Family Inheritance

The question raised here is: How does the issue of family "inheritance" look in the newly elected Chamber of Deputies? What are this chamber's social characteristics, compared with the last parliamentary elections that were held in 1972?

The outcome of the latest elections shows that 58 families will enter the Chamber of Deputies for the first time—excluding the Kasrawan elections and the deputies appointed in 1991. A total of 22 deputies come from families represented in previous chambers and returning to the new chamber, including 18 deputies who were members of the chamber elected in 1972 (see Table 3). Among those returning are nine deputies who have served two or more previous terms, including former Prime Minister Amin al-Hafiz, Katchik Babikian, Soren Khan Amirian, Habib Kayruz, Qabalan 'Isa al-Khuri, and 'Abd-al-Latif al-Zayn, each of whom served four previous terms.

What is interesting about the new chamber is that the average age of its deputies is close to that of the deputies elected to the 1972 chamber. The average age of the deputies in the 1972 chamber was 50 years and one month, and the average age of the deputies in the new chamber is 50 years and 45 days.

If the Mount Lebanon Governorate, specifically the Kasrawan Electoral District, had the age seniority in the 1972 chamber with the presence of Deputy Maurice Zuwayn, who was born in 1898, then al-Shamal Electoral District has taken over this seniority in the latest election with the return of former Deputy Qabalan 'Isa al-Khuri, who was born in 1911 and who is 81. Whereas Beirut and al-Shamal shared the secretariat of the 1972 chamber by electing the chamber's two youngest members, namely Najah Wakim and Talal al-Mar'ibi, who were born in 1946, to hold this position. Al-Shamal Governorate has maintained this distinction in the new assembly by electing Sulayman Tony Franjiyah, who, born in 1964, is 26 [as published], which was also the youngest age of a member in the preceding chamber. Meanwhile, 'Alayh District has taken over Beirut's previous role by electing Talal Arslan, who was born in 1963. Thus, one secretary of the new assembly is a year older than the secretary of the previous assembly.

The phenomenon of the "older age" of the youngest and the oldest in the new assembly, coupled with a drop in the average age of the other deputies, could make a difference in some family related social aspects. Whereas the 99 deputies elected to the 1972 chamber included 15 bachelors, the new chamber has only six bachelors (excluding widowers and divorcees) out of 123 [as published] deputies, meaning that while the ratio in the 1972 chamber was two bachelors per 13 deputies, this ratio

amounts to two bachelors per 41 deputies in the new assembly, or one bachelor per 20.5 deputies.

Sociology could take a long pause before the phenomenon of a lower average age coupled with a higher marriage rate in the new chamber. There is no place for dwelling on this phenomenon here.

Returning Families

If one of the new chamber's social phenomena is this overwhelming assault by new families who enter the chamber for the first time through parliamentary elections, and most of whom do not represent a "strong" parliamentary legacy, then the families returning to the chamber are the following: Skaf, al-Harawi, al-Khatib, al-Dawud, al-Farzali, al-Husayni, Yaghi, Kayruz, 'Ammar, Bakhus, Lahhud, al-Ashqar, al-Murr, Abu-Fadil, Junblatt, Hamadah, 'Awn, al-Bustani, 'Abd-al-Nur, Arslan, al-Sa'd, Hilu, 'Awwad, al-Khuri, al-Hafiz, Karami, Kabbarah, al-Khayr, al-Mar'ibi, Dahir, al-Sarraf, al-Rasi, al-Duwayhi, Mu'awwad, Franjiyah, Sa'adah, Ghusn, Yunis, 'Aql, Tarabulusi, al-Sulh, Fakhuri, al-Huss, Baydun, Burjawi, Wakim, Khan Amirian, Babikian, 'Usayran, Sa'd al-Misri, al-Zayn, al-Khalil, al-As'ad, Kan'an, 'Azar, and Salim.

A quick glance at the families returning to the chamber shows that the return of more than 18 families is tied more to one individual than it is to the presence of a "family with a parliamentary legacy inherited generation after generation." If we add to these families the names of the two Armenian deputies who have returned to the chamber because of special circumstances and conditions, then of the 56 families returning to the chamber, nearly 20 do not fit the description of a deep-rooted "parliamentary house." But this family parliamentary representation in the new chamber has very special characteristics, of which the most important are:

A. The proliferation of more than one sect and denomination by the same family names. Parliamentary continuity of the al-Husayni clan, for example, has been accomplished with the presence of Deputy Hashim al-Husayni, a Sunni, with clan representatives from the Shiite sect. This proliferation is also embodied in the presence of Deputy Anwar al-Khalil, a Druze, with 'Ali and Kazim al-Khalil, two Shiite deputies, and in the presence of Ahmad and Muhammad al-Burjawi, two Sunni deputies, in the chamber's sixth, eighth, and 11th sessions with Muhammad al-Burjawi, who was elected recently as a representative of the Shiite sect. It is further embodied in the return of the Sa'adah clan to the new chamber through Salim Sa'adah, an Orthodox deputy, in the absence of George and Antoine Sa'adah, two Maronite ex-deputies. The Hamadah clan has maintained its presence through Marwan Hamadah, a new Druze deputy, in the "absence of the Sabri Hamadah family from the chamber."

B. The return of some families to the new chamber has taken place in the absence of leaders of these parliamentary houses by death or by not running for election, thus

making the continuity emerging in the latest elections tantamount to a "settlement of inheritance" in the interest of the newly-elected deputy and, consequently, the interest of the continued parliamentary representation of these deep-rooted historical families. Perhaps this statement applies to the Junblatt, Arslan, Karami, al-Zayn, 'Usayran, Skaf, Lahhud, al-Dawud, al-Khatib, Dahir, Franjiyah, Mu'awwad, al-Sulh, Baydun, al-Khalil, al-As'ad, Kan'an, and Salim families.

C. The inheritance of representation by virtue of "blood relations," though relatively limited in the new chamber, seems to be strong. This is demonstrated by the following: Yusuf al-Zayn, who was deputy in the first, second, third, fourth, sixth, eighth, ninth, and tenth legislative assemblies, bequeathed the deputyship to his sons 'Abd-al-Latif, 'Abd-al-Karim, and 'Abd-al-Majid. 'Abd-al-Latif, who has returned to the chamber, is the one who has gotten the biggest part of the inheritance, considering that he has continued to serve as deputy without interruption from the time his father died to the present.

Al-As'ad family, whose deputyship started in the first legislative assembly with 'Abd-al-Latif, bequeathed its deputyship to its son Ahmad throughout the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and tenth assemblies. When Ahmad al-As'ad died, the family bequeathed its deputyship to his son, namely Kamil Ahmad 'Abd-al-Latif al-As'ad, who did not win in the latest elections. However, al-As'ad representation has shifted for the first time from the "house of 'Abd-al-Latif al-As'ad" to kinsman Sa'id.

This also applies to the Salim clan, which had a deputy in the first assembly and which was represented in the fourth, fifth, 10th, and 12th chambers in the person of Yusuf Ibrahim Salim and then his brother Niquila Ibrahim Salim, who, while he was still alive, bequeathed the family deputyship to his son, Nadim, in 1972. Nadim won in the latest elections.

These "hereditary remarks" also apply to the Karami clan, which entered the chamber with 'Abd-al-Hamid Karami, who bequeathed the deputyship to his martyred son, Rashid. This deputyship was transferred after Rashid was martyred to his brother, 'Umar. The same goes for the Franjiyah clan deputyship, which started with Qabalan, was then transferred to his son, Hamid, and then from Hamid to his brother, Sulayman, and from Sulayman to son Antoine, and then to Sulayman Jr.

The Lahhud clan does not swerve from this mode. The family deputyship began with Emile Lahhud and then transferred to Rufa'il, to Jamil, to Salim Nasib Lahhud, and then to Fu'ad Nasib Lahhud. In the latest elections, the deputyship was awarded to Nasib Salim Lahhud, the other Lahhuds having already died.

Al-Khatib clan's deputyship is also close to these phenomena. This deputyship started with Ahmad al-Khatib and was then transferred to Anwar, his son, and then

from Anwar to Zahir Anwar al-Khatib who has restored the family glory in the chamber through the latest elections.

It is the same with the Skaf clan deputyship, which started with Ilyas Tu'mah Skaf and was transferred to Jean, Joseph Tu'mah Skaf, Michel Ilyas Skaf, and then to Ilyas Joseph Skaf in the latest elections.

Al-Dawud clan deputyship began with Nasib and was then transferred to Salim Nasib al-Dawud and landed with Faysal Salim Nasib al-Dawud in the latest elections.

D. The manifestations of "hereditary" deputyship in deep-rooted families in whom the deputyship has been transferred from father to son by virtue of blood relations show that these families are not large, but rather the inverse, as demonstrated by the number of family members of the Junblatt, al-As'ad, 'Usayran, Karami, Arslan, al-Dawud, al-Sulh, and Salim families, as well as other families.

What do these social phenomena in the new Chamber of Deputies mean?

Nonnumerical Parliamentary "House"

The answer to the above question could be confined to two fundamental points:

First, the rise of the "historical parliamentary house" in Lebanon has not often relied on families with large numbers of members but on the presence of a "leader" capable of attracting people to his person. This point may be embodied in the new deputies who have entered the chamber for the first time and who could proceed to build parliamentary glory for the family to which they belong. This phenomenon also raises the question of how possible it is to free elected Lebanese officials from family affiliation. Such liberation would constitute a positive phenomenon, if channeled to serve the development of sound party life to which parliamentary life and elections are tied in one form or another.

Second, the "wave" of new faces leaving their imprint on the 1992 elections is not truly new in the general political sense of the word because a considerable number of the new deputies have "inherited" the deputyship. If the ones who the seats were inherited from were alive, the new faces would not have gotten into the new chamber. This is perhaps true of the deputyship of the Skaf, Arslan, Junblatt, Karami, al-Khatib, al-Zayn, Salim, al-Dawud, Lahhud, Abu-Fadil, 'Awn, 'Abd-al-Nur, Mu'awwad, al-Duwayhi, Ghusn, 'Usayran, Sa'd, and Kan'an families.

Thus, it can be said that the latest elections have been split between continued representation of the parliamentary families and new faces, in the political sense of new. The question that dictates itself now is: Will this "division" lead to a change in the course and mechanism of parliamentary action?

There is no doubt that something that did not exist in the previous chambers will exist in the new chamber.

It is true that some changes of faces in the chamber are tied to the element of blood relations and inheritance. But it is also indubitable that the new heir of a parliamentary house is different from the benefactor in terms of method, policy, position, education, planning, culture, and perhaps even commitment.

Therefore, it can be said that the new chamber will be inevitably new in whatever pertains to the course of its action, whether regarding the mechanism of domestic action or regarding the tasks entrusted to it legally. Though one cannot wager on whether this change in the new council will be positive or negative, it is certain that

the new chamber has lost parliamentary figures so experienced in representative action and in the parliamentary game that they have become the most prominent specialists in this regard. In what parliamentary assembly in the world are there deputies who have held the deputyship for 67 years or 50 years without interruption? Consequently, the new chamber will, at least in the early phases, be in the direst need of a Rashid Karami, Kamal Junblatt, Nasri al-Ma'luf, Kamil al-As'ad, 'Adil 'Usayran, Raymond Iddih, Hasan al-Rifa'i, Sa'ib Salam, Sabri Hamadah, Rene Mu'awwad, Pierre al-Jumayyil, Kazim al-Khalil, Edmund Rizq, Albert Mukhaybir, Mahmud 'Ammar, Majid Arslan, and a Louis Abu-Sharaf, and many others. What common factor will tie the new chamber with the past chambers now that [the late] Speaker Sabri Hamadah has been absent from Lebanon's elections for the first time?

Table 1

Families Represented Most in Chamber Since First Assembly	Number of Times Represented	Number of Individuals Who Have Represented Them
Arslan	15	4
Al-As'ad	15	4
Hamadah	15	3
Al-Husayni	15	4
Al-Khuri	29	13
Iddih	13	3
Franjiyah	12	4
Lahhud	12	5

Families represented in the chamber without interruption since independence: Hamadah, al-As'ad, al-Husayni, Arslan, Franjiyah, and Lahhud.

Parliamentary Representation According to Number of Terms From First Legislative Assembly To Latest Elections

Single-Term Deputies	195
Two-Term Deputies	84
Three-Term Deputies	30
Four-Term Deputies	35
Five-Term Deputies	21
Six-Term Deputies	10
Seven-Term Deputies	7
Eight-Term Deputies	3
Nine-Term Deputies	1
10-Term Deputies	—
11-Term Deputies	—
12-Term Deputies	1
13-Term Deputy, i.e. in All Chambers	1

Veteran Deputies Returning to the New Chamber

Deputy's Name	Number of Terms
Nadim Salim	1
August Bakhus	1
Michel al-Murr	1
Zahir al-Khatib	2
Pierre Hilu	1
Rashid al-Sulh	2
Muhammad Yusuf Baydun	1
Najah Wakim	1
Soren Khan Amirian	4
Khatchik Babikian	4
Husayn al-Husayni	1
Amin al-Hafiz	4
Salih al-Khayr	1
Talal al-Mar'ibi	1
Mikha'il Dahir	2
'Abdallah al-Rasi	1
Qabalan 'Isa al-Khuri	4
Habib Kayruz	4
Manuel Yunis	1
Sayid 'Aql	1
'Abd-al-Latif al-Zayn	4
'Ali al-Khalil	1

New Deputies Constitute Majority of Chamber

93AE0070C London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
4 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Shukri Nasrallah: "More Than 100 New Deputies Out of Total of 128 Deputies"]

[Text] Paris—Whatever the outcome of the Kasrawan District elections, they will result in the success or failure of veteran Deputy Ilyas al-Khazin who is the only one from the 1972 chamber to run for reelection in this district. If al-Khazin wins, the number of deputies who will continue to hold their positions will amount to 19. If luck deserts him, the 1992 parliament, which is comprised of 128 deputies, will include 110 new deputies and 18 veteran deputies.

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has conducted a survey on the number of new and veteran, including deceased, deputies and has come out with the following lists:

First, of the 99 deputies of the 1972 chamber, 42 have died, and 57 are alive. The latter's term will end at midnight on 14 October [1992].

Second, out of the surviving 57 deputies from the 99-member 1972 chamber, 18 have been reelected in the elections held in the past two months. These veterans are: Husayn al-Husayni, Amin al-Hafiz, Salih al-Khayr,

Talal al-Mar'ibi, 'Abdallah al-Rasi, Mikha'il al-Dahir, Habib Kayruz, August Bakhus, Zahir al-Khatib, Pierre Hilu, Rashid al-Sulh, Muhammad Baydun, Najah Wakim, Khatchik Babikian, Soren Khan Amirian, Nadim Salim, 'Abd-al-Latif al-Zayn, and 'Ali al-Khalil.

Third, in the recently elected chamber, there are 105 new deputies, not counting those who will win in Kasrawan, who total five in number, and 18 veteran deputies. They are divided as follows:

- Al-Biqa' and al-Hirmil: 23 deputies, of whom 22 were elected last August and one reelected from the 1972 chamber, namely Husayn al-Husayni.
- Al-Shamal: 28 deputies, of whom 22 are new and six are veterans.
- Mount Lebanon: 30 deputies, of whom 27 are new and three are veterans, namely Pierre al-Hilu, August Bakhus, and Zahir al-Khatib.
- Beirut: 19 Deputies, including 14 new deputies and five veteran deputies, namely Rashid al-Sulh, Muhammad Yusuf Baydun, Najah Wakim, Khatchik Babikian, and Soren Khan Amirian.
- Al-Janub: 23 deputies, including 20 new deputies and three veterans, namely Nadim Salim, 'Abd-al-Latif al-Zayn, and 'Ali al-Khalil.

According to the order of districts and governorates, the picture is as follows:

First, the reelected veterans, i.e., those who have been deputies since 1972 (at least) and who were reelected last month, are:

- Zahlah: None of the seven deputies.
- Al-Biqā' al-Gharbi: None of the six deputies.
- Al-Hirmil: One (Husayn al-Husayni) out of 10 deputies.
- Tarabulus (Tripoli): One (Amin al-Hafiz) out of eight deputies.
- Tarabulus (Tripoli) District: One (Salih al-Khayr) out of three deputies.
- 'Akkar: Three, namely Talal al-Mar'ibi 'Abdallah al-Rasi, and Mikhayil al-Dahir, out of seven deputies.
- Zgharta: None of the three deputies.
- Al-Kurah: None of the three deputies.
- Bsharri: One (Habib Kayruz) out of two deputies.
- Al-Batrun: None of the two deputies.
- Al-Matn: One (August Bakhus) out of eight deputies.
- Al-Shuf: One (Zahir al-Khatib) out of eight deputies.
- 'Alayh: One (Pierre Hilu) out of five deputies.
- B'abda: None of the six deputies.
- Jubayl: None of the three deputies.
- Sidon: None of the two deputies.
- Al-Zahrani: None of the three deputies.
- Jazzin: None of the three deputies.
- Bint Jubayl: None of the three deputies.
- Al-Nabatiyah: One ('Abd-al-Latif al-Zayn) out of three deputies.
- Marj 'Uyun: None of the five deputies.
- Sur (Tyre): One ('Ali al-Khalil) out of four deputies.
- Kasrawan: Unknown. If Ilyas al-Khazin wins, the ratio will be one veteran to five deputies. If he loses, the ratio will be no reelected veterans out of five deputies.

Who are the new deputies, and how are they distributed?

- In Beirut (which gets 19 deputies), 14 out of 19 deputies are new, namely: Salim al-Huss, Muhammad Qabbani, Usamah Fakhuri, 'Isam Nu'man, Joseph Mughayzil, Asmar al-Asmar, Norjian Demerjian, Zuhayr al-'Ubaydi, 'Adnan Tarabulusi, Muhammad Burjawi, Ghassan Matar, Bisharah Murhij, Yaghia Georgian, Agop Jokhdarian.
- In al-Shamal, 13 out of a total of 28 deputies are new, namely: Muhammad Kabbarah, 'Umar Misqawi, Muhammad Yakan, Salim Habib, Muhammad Tabbu, As'ad Harmush, Hasan 'Izz-al-Din, Riyadh al-Sarraf, Farid Makkawi, Fayiz Ghush, Qabalan 'Isa al-Khuri, Sayid 'Aql, and Manuel Yunis.
- In Mount Lebanon, 27 out of a total of 30 deputies are new, namely: Michel al-Murr, Nasib Lahhud, Nahe Barhomian, Walid Junblatt, Marwan Hamadah, Talal Arslan, Muhammad Shuhayb, Fu'ad al-Sa'd, Eli Hubayqah, Ayman Shuqayr, Nabil Bustani, George Ni'mah, Samir 'Awn, Khalil 'Abd-al-Nur, 'Ala'-al-Din Tarru, Jean Ghanim, Antoine Khalil, 'Ali

'Ammar, Basim al-Sab', Michel Samahah, Ghassan al-Ashqar, Habib Hakim, Riyadh Abu-Fadil, Maha al-Khuri, Michel al-Khuri, Muhammad 'Awwad, and Marwan Munir Abu-Fadil.

- In al-Biqā', 22 out of a total of 23 deputies are new. The new deputies in al-Biqā' al-Gharbi, al-Hirmil, and Zahlah are: Eli Skaf, Niqua Fattush, Yusuf al-Ma'luf, George Nasarji [Qasarji], Khalil al-Harawi, 'Ali Mita, Robert Ghanim, Sami al-Khatib, Ibrahim al-Sayyid, 'Ali Taha, Muhammad Yaghi, Khadr Tarabulusi, Ibrahim Bayan, Munir al-Hujayri, Rabi'ah Kayruz, Sa'ud Rufayil, and Yahya Shams.
- In al-Janub, 20 out of a total of 23 deputies are new, namely: Nabih Birri, 'Abdallah al-Amin, As'ad Marwan, Muhammad Yusuf Baydun, Bahiyah al-Hariri, Mustafa Sa'd, 'Ali 'Usayran, Michel Musa, Samir 'Azar, Sulayman Kan'an, Hasan 'Alawiyah, Muhammad Ra'd, 'Imad Jabir, Habib Sadiq, Ahmad Suwayd, Sa'id al-As'ad, Muhammad Funaysh, and Ahmad 'Ajami.
- In Kasrawan: No results have been announced yet.


In summary, a total of 105 to 110 new deputies (depending on the outcome of the Kasrawan election battle) will enter the new Lebanese Chamber of Deputies. Of these, 107 will enter it for the first time, and three, namely Qabalan 'Isa al-Khuri, Manuel Yunis, and Sayid 'Aql, were deputies prior to 1972. Of these deputies, 29 have had the experience of being in the Chamber for a year through appointment. These 29 deputies, along with 10 others, were appointed to bring the number up to 108 deputies, as stipulated by the al-Ta'if accord. Forty deputies were supposed to be appointed but the death of Deputy Fu'ad al-Tahini (from al-Shuf) during the grace period set by the appointment decree caused the appointment to be confined to 39 deputies.

There is much talk and speculation on the legitimacy of this chamber. Throughout the past 17 years, however, Lebanon has witnessed numerous illegal acts and decrees that have become legitimate by virtue of fait accompli or by silence. Regardless of whether this new chamber emanates from a very small percentage of voters or not, its legitimacy will inevitably be a de facto. According to statistics, only 30 percent of the Muslims and five percent of the Christians have voted. But this will not impede the chamber's legitimacy in the next two years. According to the recent past, the Lebanese accused General 'Awn's government of being illegitimate even though it issued the passports with which all the Lebanese, including those who did not acknowledge its legitimacy, traveled. Before long, that legitimacy was toppled in favor of its adversary and laws, decrees, and passports became aligned with the new government, and so it goes.

While awaiting the end of the Kasrawan election battle, the 99-member chamber will still have two weeks to go. As for what comes after 15 October, we will cross that bridge when we come to it.

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